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Abstract
Essays on Social Influences in Economic Decision Making
Daniel Wecker Argyle
Understanding social influences is vitally important to understanding human behav-
ior; unfortunately, observing and measuring these effects is extremely difficult. This
dissertation focuses on applying and developing techniques to measure social influences
on individual decision making. The first chapter develops two techniques for estimating
social influences using friendship networks, even when individuals differ on unobserv-
able attributes. The second chapter uses social networks sampled from villages in India
to demonstrate strong peer influences on an individual’s decision to take a microfinance
loan. The final chapter examines changes in juvenile criminal behavior in response
to their schools changing to a four-day school week. An abstract for each chapter is
provided below.
Chapter 1 Abstract: Existing methods for identifying peer effects in social net-
works require the assumption that there are no unobserved factors that determine both
network links and the outcome of interest. Since this assumption is likely to be violated
in most networks, I provide two distinct methods for estimating peer effects in the
presence of individual heterogeneity. First, I show that if repeated observations on
individuals are available, accounting for time-invariant individual attributes can restore
vii
identification. Second, I suggest a semi-parametric Bayesian instrumental variables tech-
nique that can be used to estimate peer effects models when panel data is not available
or if fixed effects assumptions are undesirable. I demonstrate the properties of both
strategies using simulated network data and provide evidence that both are able to esti-
mate peer effects, even when networks exhibit sorting on observable and unobservable
attributes. Additionally, I apply both techniques to estimate peer effects in the United
States Congress using cosponsorship networks and voting outcomes.
Chapter 2 Abstract: I use friendship networks from villages in rural India to
provide a careful examination of peer effects in decisions to take up microfinance.
Using social networks resolves the traditional identification problems associated with
peer effect estimation and allows each individual to have their own peer group. Since
the networks in question are sampled and some friendship information is missing, I
use an analytic correction to ensure unbiased estimates as well as a technique known
as graphical reconstruction to provide bounds on estimators accounting for possible
configurations of the unobserved links in the data. In addition to including a variety of
individual covariates, I control for observable characteristics of an individual’s peers,
examine different ways of specifying network links, and account for the probability
of being informed about the program. Across these specifications I find positive and
significant peer effects; an additional friend participating in microfinance increases the
probability that an individual participates in microfinance by 6%-10%.
viii
Chapter 3 Abstract: There has been a recent trend to implement four-day school
weeks, especially in rural areas. We show that changing to a four-day school week influ-
ences youth criminal activity in jurisdictions where these policies take effect, especially
impacting property crime. Focusing on Colorado, where four-day school weeks are
especially prevalent, we show that switching all students in a county to a four-day week
leads to 0.75 additional juvenile arrests for larceny per 1,000 residents. Effects on other
types of crime are inconclusive; estimated signs on drug and violent crimes are negative,
although neither attains statistical significance.
Professor Richard Startz
Dissertation Committee Chair
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Chapter 1. Individual Heterogeneity and Peer Effects
1.1 Introduction
Peer effects emerge in many settings where a social group may influence an indi-
vidual’s outcome. Traditionally, economic research exploits some sort of exogenous
variation in social group formation to examine effects as diverse as academic achieve-
ment (Sacerdote, 2001), health habits (Carrell et al., 2011), and income (Lerner and
Malmendier, 2011). Recent work in econometrics has focused more on how peer effects
can be identified even when social groups vary at the individual level and are selected by
the individual. Bramoullé et al. (2009) establish conditions for the identification of peer
effects from a social network.1 In so doing, they require a strict exogeneity assumption
that is violated if unobserved attributes affect both the network formation process and the
outcome of interest. Since this is unlikely to be true in most networks, I generalize the
exogeneity assumption to allow for unobserved time-invariant individual level attributes.
If repeated observations on individuals are available, I show that identification of peer ef-
fects is restored under the more general assumption and that the parameters of the model
can be consistently estimated using and instrumental variables procedure. In addition, I
propose a semi-parametric estimation strategy that is robust to individual heterogeneity
and may be appropriate in cases where panel assumptions are undesirable or panel data
is not available. The semi-parametric technique has the advantage of flexibly accounting
for individual heterogeneity and does not require the same assumptions that the panel
1De Giorgi et al. (2010) established similar results nearly simultaneously.
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methods do. Both panel and semi-parametric estimation have different strengths and
each may be appropriate depending on the data that is available; I demonstrate their
strengths and weaknesses in simulated networks and in an application estimating peer
effects in Congressional voting.
Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) also set out to account for individual unob-
servable characteristics that affect both the network formation process and the outcome
using the Bramoullé et al. (2009) framework. They posit a specific network formation
process that depends on a binary individual-level latent attribute that is also allowed to
affect the outcome.2 This approach has the advantage of only requiring a single network;
however, this comes at the expense of nontrivial additional assumptions. Most notably,
this procedure requires that the posited network formation process correctly specifies
the true formation process. In contrast, the approach taken in this paper requires no
specific assumptions about the structure of the network formation process, stipulating
only that the network must be formed exogenously from the data generating process for
the outcome.
There are two specific ways that networks are assumed to be exogenous. I first
examine a scenario where the network is fixed and multiple outcomes are observed;
in this case the structure of the network can be taken as given in the subsequent data
2Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) do consider a situation where they have two observations
of a networks observed at distinct points in time; however, their primary concern is using the networks
to estimate the specific network formation process suggested in their work. In addition, they also
explore several interesting extensions of the model, most notably including spatial auto-regressive and
moving-average models.
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generating process for the outcomes. Second, I generalize peer effects estimation to a
situation where the network is allowed to vary over time; however, the networks must
be independent from one another conditional on modeled individual covariates. In the
empirical application I examine voting behavior of legislators in a Congressional session
where friendship links are determined by cosponsorship decisions. In this context, the
first scenario corresponds to a case where cosponsorship decisions of legislators is
determined separately from their voting decisions. To increase the plausibility of this
assumption, the empirical application uses cosponsorship networks from the previous
legislative session to explain votes in the current session. The second case corresponds
to a scenario where the presence of a cosponsorship link in a congressional session is
assumed to be determined solely by observable attributes of the legislators; the existence
of the link in a previous congressional session has no impact on whether or not the
link is formed in this session. While this assumption initially appears quite restrictive,
it represents an important initial step in estimating peer effects in dynamic networks
that vary over time. In addition, this assumption is plausible in the context of Congress.
Legislators are much more likely form links strategically (i.e. based on observables)
than is typical in a friendship network; furthermore, elections regularly change the
composition of Congress and make it more plausible that the network resets periodically.
The plausibility of these assumptions is a key focus of the empirical application and will
be discussed in more detail in Section 1.6.
4
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I begin by exploring a situation where the network does not change and multiple out-
comes are observed for each individual in Section 1.2. I generalize the strict exogeneity
assumption to allow for individual level unobservables, and I show that with fixed effects
estimation identification of peer effects is restored. In Section 1.3 I generalize the frame-
work to examine a single outcome per network from multiple networks with overlapping,
but not identical, membership. Estimation in this setting requires assumptions about
the network formation process, and I discuss situations where these assumptions are
appropriate. I outline a semi-parametric instrumental variables estimation strategy that
can estimate these peer effects in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5 I compare the performance
of the panel techniques and the semi-parametric method on simulated networks and
outcomes. Section 1.6 contains the results of an empirical application to congressional
voting patterns. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Peer Effects in a Single Network
Consider the linear-in-means model
yi = β0+βy¯y¯(i)+βxxi+βx¯x¯(i)+ εi (1.1)
5
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where an individual’s outcome is a function of the mean outcome of their peer group
(y¯(i)), individual level covariates (x), and the mean of peer group covariates (x¯(i)).3
Manski (1993) discusses the estimation of these two kinds of peer effects. The first, an
endogenous peer effect (βy¯), is the effect of the average outcome of an individual’s peer
group on that individual’s outcome. The second, an exogenous peer effect (βx¯), is the
effect of the average of a given attribute of the peer group on an individual’s outcome. In
addition, Manski draws a distinction between these peer effects and contextual effects,
which emerge because individuals in a social group share an environment. As an example
to illustrate these different types of effects, consider a situation in which we are trying
to estimate peer effects on a student’s GPA with family income as the covariate. In
this case, the endogenous peer effect is the effect of the student’s friends’ average GPA
on the student’s GPA, the exogenous peer effect is the effect of the student’s friends’
average family income on the student’s GPA, and contextual factors are unobservable
variables that affect all individuals in the peer group equally, such as teacher quality or
school spending.4
In Manski’s framework, endogenous and exogenous peer effects are unable to be
separately identified. As postulated by Moffitt et al. (2001), identification of peer effects
fails for three reasons: simultaneity, because the outcome enters on both sides of the
3I follow the notational/expositional convention of Bramoullé et al. (2009) and other literature in this
area that assumes only a single covariate x; however, all that follows is general to multiple covariates. The
notation I use most closely resembles Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013).
4Note that this scenario is examined in Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013).
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regression model, correlated unobservables, because all members of a peer group share
an environment and an unobservable shock to the environment could be confounded
with a peer effect, and endogenous membership, which makes it difficult to distinguish
between peers being similar to one another because they influence one another and
these peers selecting to be friends because they already were similar (this concept is
also known as homophily). Bramoullé et al. (2009) proposes a peer effect model that
relies on a generic social network structure to identify peer effects and resolves these
identification problems, most notably they show that the reflection problem (simultaneity)
is resolved because each individual’s peer group is different. However, identification
requires the assumption that any unobservable attributes that affect the outcome do not
affect the network formation process; if this assumption is violated peer effects are not
identified and estimation of model parameters is inconsistent. I introduce the idea of
social networks as peer groups below and show that a generalization of the peer effects
model can account for individual level unobservables, which restores identification and
consistent estimation.
1.2.1 Social Networks as Peer Groups
Peer effects are traditionally estimated when individuals are partitioned into distinct
groups such as classrooms or offices. Social networks allow for estimation of peer
effects based on peer groups that are different for each individual. Consider a generic
7
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social network described by an adjacency matrix A, where Ai j represents the relationship
between individuals i and j. It is useful to have the matrix in row-normalized5 form G,
where each of the links between individuals are weighted by the total number of links
(∑nj=1 Ai j = Mi) that an individual has, i.e.
Gi j =
Ai j
∑nj=1 Ai j
=
Ai j
Mi
. (1.2)
Adjacency matrices are quite flexible, allowing for directed relationships, where an
individual influences another without being influenced back (Ai j 6= A ji), and weighted
relationships, where some links are allowed to be more important. Because of this
flexibility, a social network nests previous peer effects models, including the formulations
of Manski (1993), Moffitt et al. (2001), and Lee (2007).6 In all of these cases the
adjacency matrix consists of block diagonal peer groups where all individuals in a given
group are weighted equally.
Returning to the linear in means model in Equation 1.1, it is possible to express the
group means as function of the network. The endogenous peer effect is a weighted sum
5A row-normalized matrix has the advantage of scaling elements of the adjacency matrix so that the
strength of relationships can be compared across individuals; for example in the application this takes
into account the frequency with which legislators cosponsor bills. Additionally, Bramoullé et al. (2009)
and Lee (2007) note that a row-normalized matrix is more likely to meet the assumptions required for
identification of the peer effects. Note that calculating the row-normalized form assumes that there are no
isolated nodes (i.e. nodes that have no links) or that isolated nodes are removed from the network.
6Bramoullé et al. (2009) demonstrate that these formulations share their original identification
properties.
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of of an individual’s peers as given by the adjacency matrix:
y¯(i) =
1
Mi
n
∑
j=1
Ai jy j =
n
∑
j=1
Gi jy j (1.3)
where n is the number of individuals in the network and Mi is the number of friends
individual i has (the number of nonzero entries on row i of A). The mean for the
exogenous variable x¯(i) is defined similarly. By convention the diagonal of the adjacency
matrix is set to 0, ruling out the possibility of self-links, which results in i’s own outcome
being omitted from the group mean calculation. In this sense the model resembles
the formulation of Moffitt et al. (2001), which calculates group means omitting the
individual in question. Additionally, it is useful to write the model in matrix form,
y = β0i+βy¯Gy+βxx+βx¯Gx+ ε (1.4)
where i represents a vector of ones of length n. Note that as a direct result of matrix
multiplication and row-normalization, Gy results in a vector of length n where each
entry is y¯(i).
Bramoullé et al. (2009) establish conditions for separate identification of the exoge-
nous and endogenous peer effect under the assumption of strict exogeneity E[ε|x,G] = 0.
In addition to the exogeneity assumption, identification requires that the matrices In, G,
and G2 are linearly independent.7 Notably, the strict exogeneity assumption is violated
7Intuition for the linear independence condition will be discussed below in the generalized model.
Identification of the reduced form also requires the condition that βxβy¯+βx¯ 6= 0; however, a violation of
this condition is so unlikely to occur that it will be ignored through the rest of the paper.
9
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if there are unobserved factors that are correlated with both the outcome of the model
and the network formation process, i.e. the assumption requires that the only factors that
impact the network formation process are those that are also included in the regression
model. This assumption is unlikely to hold in many settings, including the application in
Bramoullé et al. (2009) who attempt to find peer effects in the number of extracurricular
activities in which students participate. If a student has a fixed unobservable attribute,
such as extroversion, that affects both the number of friends they have (or who they make
friends with) and the number of extracurricular activities they pursue, strict exogeneity
does not hold. Generalizing this assumption to correct for these unobservable attributes
is the focus of the remainder of the section.
It is important to note that this framework does not require that the social groups
be imposed exogenously.8 The network can be endogenously determined, in the sense
that peer groups can be the result of individual choices, but these choices must be
uncorrelated with the individual error term εi. Otherwise, we risk confounding an
individual peer effect with effects that actually result from sorting on unobservables.
Stated another way, the data generating process for the outcome is assumed to be
independent from the process that formed the network. This impacts the subsequent
results in two distinct ways. I initially begin by assuming that the network is fixed when
8While these assumptions allow estimation of the model with endogenous social groups, imposing
exogenous groups often means the assumptions required for identification are met ex ante. Thus, the
common practice in economics of relying on exogenous variation in group structure to identify peer
effects is nested as a special case, whereas the work here emphasizes applications to endogenously formed
networks and discusses issues that arise when examining these networks.
10
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the outcomes are generated. Subsequently, I allow networks that vary across outcomes
and I discuss the assumptions about the network generation process that are required
for this to be valid. Mathematically the two assumptions are both formalized by taking
expected values conditional on the specific realization of the network generated by some
network generation process. In addition, I proceed assuming that the observed network
perfectly represents the underlying social structure. Sampled networks or networks that
are measured with error can have significant and somewhat unpredictable effects in peer
effects estimation (see Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2012).
1.2.2 Fixed Network with Multiple Outcomes
Consider a variation of the peer effects model where the outcome y and the exogenous
variable x are observed B times for each individual and the network does not change.9
The regression model then becomes
yib = β0+βy¯y¯(i)b+βxxib+βx¯x¯(i)b+ εib (1.5)
where b indexes the observed outcomes and exogenous variables. Now that the model
includes multiple observations for each individual I make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 (Individual Heterogeneity). The error term takes the form εib = γi+νib
9This situation is not as uncommon as it may seem and is discussed in Section 1.7. For now, suffice it
to observe that this corresponds to an experiment where people are divided (or select) into groups and
multiple outcomes are observed, possibly over time. As formulated this model also has many similarities
to models derived in geography and urban economics. In fact, the estimation strategy proposed by
Bramoullé et al. (2009) is built upon techniques from spatial econometrics.
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Assumption 1 decomposes the error term into a fixed attribute γi that does not vary across
outcomes and an idiosyncratic term νib. I proceed with the conventional assumption that
γi and νib are uncorrelated which is necessary for identification. Explicitly including the
individual fixed effect γi in the regression model in Equation 1.5 yields:
yib = β0+βy¯y¯(i)b+βxxib+βx¯x¯(i)b+ γi+νib (1.6)
and now it is straightforward to take the conventional within transformation10 to account
for the individual fixed effect(
yib− ∑
B
b=1 yib
B
)
=βy¯
(
y¯(i)b−
∑Bb=1 y¯(i)b
B
)
+βx
(
xib− ∑
B
b=1 xib
B
)
+βx¯
(
x¯(i)b−
∑Bb=1 x¯(i)b
B
)
+
(
νib
∑Bb=1νib
B
)
where each term in the regression is de-meaned by its average over all observed outcomes.
This model is written more concisely as
y∗ib = βy¯y¯
∗
(i)b+βxx
∗
ib+βx¯x¯
∗
(i)b+ν
∗
ib (1.7)
where the stars denote that the variable has undergone a within transformation. As
before, this model can also be expressed in matrix form
y∗b = βy¯Gy
∗
b+βxx
∗
b+β
∗
x¯ Gx
∗
b+ν
∗
b (1.8)
10As is frequently the case in these situations, this process can also be solved through explicit estimation
of fixed/random effects parameters. I focus on the within transformation primarily to limit the number
of parameters that must be estimated as the Bayesian estimation strategies used in this paper can be
computationally intensive; however, in many settings (especially short panels) it may be desirable to
specify the model differently. See also Lee and Yu (2010) and Parent and LeSage (2012) for discussions
of fixed and random effects in spatial models that address similar issues.
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under the assumption that the network is fixed for all outcomes. The model can also be
expressed over all outcomes as
y˜∗ = βy¯Gy˜∗+βxx˜∗+βx¯Gx˜∗+ ν˜ (1.9)
where x˜∗, y˜∗ and ν˜∗ are vectors with dimension (nB×1) and the matrix G = G⊗ Ib.11
Once the model has been transformed in this fashion, identifying peer effects requires
the following exogeneity assumption:
Assumption 2 (Strict Exogeneity with Individual Heterogeneity). E[ν∗b|γ,x∗b,G] = 0
where γ is a vector of individual level fixed effects. Generalizing the exogeneity assump-
tion in this fashion makes it much more plausible that the network formation process
meets the conditional exogeneity assumption; fixed individual unobservable attributes
are now assumed to affect the formation of network links in addition to the outcome.
Note that this assumption implies that the error term is uncorrelated across outcomes,
ruling out any learning behavior or time-series attributes of the outcomes.12
Once the model is transformed to account for individual heterogeneity peer effects
are identified; formally stating the result:
11G is a nB×nB block diagonal matrix with G repeated along the diagonal B times.
12Parent and LeSage (2012) provides a model that more directly addresses temporal dependence and
random effects in spatial econometric models that provide insight into how a peer effects model might
account for these effects if necessary.
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Proposition 1.1. Under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, peer effects are identified in
the multiple outcomes peer effects model in Equation 1.9 if the matrices InB, G, and G2
are linearly independent.
Proof. The transformed model, combined with the new strict exogeneity assumption and
the linear independence restriction, meets the conditions for identification established by
Bramoullé et al. (2009), proposition (1).
Note that the linear independence restriction is required to find an identifying instrument
to estimate the model. If this condition is not met, there are no valid instruments and the
parameters cannot be identified. The intuition behind this condition, along with details
of the estimation procedure, is explained in Section 1.4.
While the within transformation accounts for individual heterogeneity, it is also
possible to account for outcome level unobservables that potentially confound estimation
(analogous to time-period fixed effects). This loosens the restriction that the outcome
not exhibit time-series behavior by accounting for unobservable outcome level attributes
that affect all individuals in the same way. Accounting for outcome level unobservables
requires the following modification of Assumption 1,
εib = γi+δb+νib
where the error term is decomposed into an individual fixed effect γi an outcome level
effect δb and an idiosyncratic error term νib. In addition, the exogeneity assumption is
14
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now conditioned on the outcome level fixed effect δ
E[ν∗|γ,δ ,x∗,G] = 0.
Similar to the above result, peer effects are identified in this model because it fits the
assumptions outlined in Bramoullé et al. (2009), proposition (4).
In this section I have shown that peer effects are identified even in the presence
of individual heterogeneity. In contrast to a single network, where identification fails
unless all individuals have an error term with zero-conditional mean, when the network
is held constant and multiple outcomes are observed, fixed effects estimation can restore
identification by accounting for time invariant individual unobservable characteristics. I
now turn to a scenario where networks are allowed to change over time.
1.3 Peer Effects Across Multiple Networks
An alternate way to account for individual heterogeneity is to examine a framework
with one outcome in each of multiple networks rather than multiple outcomes from a
single network, adding the requirement that individuals belong to more than one network.
This contrasts with Bramoullé et al. (2009) who generalize their model across multiple
networks but proceed with the assumption that these networks are part of a single cross-
section and are completely independent from one another. This section shows how peer
effects can still be identified as long as the network formation process meets certain
15
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assumptions, namely link formation must be random conditional on observable attributes
of the individuals and the only correlations between separate networks are due to these
attributes.
1.3.1 Bramoullé Multiple Network Model
Consider the following generalized peer effects model where data is gathered from
multiple networks, indexed by `, and peer groups are potentially endogenous as before:
yi` = β0`+βy¯y¯(i)`+βxxi`+βx¯x¯(i)`+ εi` (1.10)
where i indexes the observations in the data and yi is observed only once in a network.
The means of the peer groups are defined as before for each individual network so that
y¯(i)` =
1
Mi
n`
∑
j=1
Ai j`yi` =
n`
∑
j=1
Gi j`yi` (1.11)
where n` is the number of individuals in network `. The peer effects model can be
transformed as before under the assumption that the error term can be decomposed as
Assumption 3 (Individual Heterogeneity in Multiple Networks). εi` = γi+νi`
and written in matrix form for a given network G`
y∗` = βy¯G`y
∗
` +βxx
∗
` +βx¯G`x
∗
` + γ+ν`. (1.12)
As in Section 1.2, the error term ν` is assumed to be independent of the individual
level attribute γ , the exogenous variable x`, and the network G`,
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Assumption 4 (Strict Exogeneity in Multiple Networks). E[ν`|γ,x`,G`] = 0.
This strict exogeneity condition implies that the error term is uncorrelated with the
process that generated the network G for each network; however, this does not imply
that the network is exogenously determined. The network formation process can be a
function of individual level observables as long as they are accounted for in the model.
In order to estimate peer effects across multiple networks it is necessary to assume
that each network is independent from one another, conditional on exogenous variables
and time invariant unobservable attributes. This allows the formation of G`, a block
diagonal matrix where the diagonal consists of matrices G`.13 If this assumption is
satisfied, along with Assumption 3 and Assumption 4, peer effects are identified as
before:
Proposition 1.2. Under Assumption 3 and Assumption 4, peer effects are identified in
the multiple networks peer effects model in Equation 1.12 if the matrices IN , G`, and G2`
are linearly independent where IN is an identity matrix of dimension N = ∑L`=1 n`.
Proof. Similar to the previous results, the transformed model, the new strict exogeneity
assumption, and the linear independence restriction meet the conditions for identification
established by Bramoullé et al. (2009), proposition (1).
13If this assumption is violated the off-diagonal elements will not be zero. For example, the lagged
value of Gi j will have some effect on Gi j.
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In addition, note that if peer effects are identified in each individual network in the joint
model, peer effects will be identified across all networks; however, the converse is not
true. Peer effects are not necessarily identified in an individual network even if they
are identified in the model with all networks. These results follow directly from the
requirements for identification in peer effects and are shown in Section A.1.
1.3.2 Accounting for Contextual Effects
In contrast to the previous section, where the network is held fixed, analyzing
multiple networks requires accounting for contextual effects, environmental factors that
affect all individuals in the network. These are analagous to the outcome fixed-effects in
the previous section, but in this case represent a specific challenge to identification of
peer effects. In the prior model with a fixed network, there is arguably a single “context”
for all of the outcomes; whereas, multiple networks each potentially have their own
contextual factors that must be accounted for in the estimation procedure.
Contextual effects are accounted for using fixed effects which in this case has a
specific matrix format. Since all individuals share the same contextual factors, we can
subtract the average of an individual’s friends’ variables from individual i’s variables.
Note that the average outcome of an individual’s friends is given by G`y` and subtracting
this quantity from the outcome yields yi−G`y` = (I−G`)y`. In matrix form, the model
18
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in Equation 1.12 becomes
(In`−G`)y` = βy¯(In`−G`)G`y`+βx(In`−G`)x`+βx¯(In`−G`)G`x`+(In`−G`)ε`
(1.13)
where In` is an n`× n` identity matrix. Bramoullé et al. (2009) refer to this as the
“within local” transformation and show that peer effects are identified in this model
if the matrices, In` , G`, G
2
` , and G
3
` are linearly independent, with the additional term
required because the entire model has been multiplied by the matrix G`. While it is
true that the within-local transformation will account for the contextual effect, it differs
from the conventional fixed effects transformation which subtracts the average of all
individuals (as opposed to just friends) from an individual’s outcome. Define the matrix
H as H` = 1n` ii
′, then the “within-global” transformation is given by
(In`−H`)y` = βy¯(In`−H`)G`y`+βx(In`−H`)x`+βx¯(In`−H`)G`x`+(In`−H`)ε`
(1.14)
In this case, peer effects can be identified if the rank(In` −G`) < n− 1 even if the
matrices above are linearly dependent.14 For this reason Bramoullé et al. (2009) state
that this model has the least restrictive identification assumptions, and I implement a
global within transformation when necessary in estimating peer effects.
14Note that if peer effects are identified with the within-local transformation they will necessarily be
identified in a within-global transformation. This new identification condition outlines scenarios where the
within-global transformation provides identification even when the within-local does not and is especially
salient for directed networks. For example, Bramoullé et al. (2009) show a case where the matrices G and
G3 are linearly dependent, but because the network is directed the rank condition still holds.
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1.3.3 Multiple Observations across Multiple Networks
It is possible to combine the above results with results from Section 1.2 to examine
multiple outcomes in multiple networks. For each observed network ` with multiple
outcomes B` the generalized version of Equation 1.9 is
y˜∗` = βy¯G˜y˜
∗
` +βxx˜
∗
` +βx¯G˜x˜
∗
` + ν˜` (1.15)
By the results in Section 1.2 and Section 1.3, as long as peer effects are identified in each
network, they will be identified in the whole model (see Section A.1). This model can
account for individual level unobservables, outcome level unobservables, and network
level unobservables through the various transformations discussed up to this point.
While I have shown that peer effects can be identified in multiple networks over
the same set of individuals, it is important to note that this setting differs from that a
single social network that is allowed to evolve overtime. The techniques derived in this
section correspond to a scenario where each new network is independently generated
(or can be assumed to be independent). Examining a single network that evolves over
time will require a different methods because in this setting links are dependent; a link
that appears in one network is highly likely to appear in subsequent networks.15 It may
15An additional complication that would need to be addressed in a dynamic setting is that it is highly
likely that subsequent links may be formed based on prior outcomes. This issue is discussed in Goldsmith-
Pinkham and Imbens (2013) who examine two networks sampled at different times from the same high
school.
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be possible to generalize these peer effects models to allow for some form of network
serial correlation; however, this task is left for future research.
1.4 Estimation Strategy
Because the exogenous peer effect is an endogenous right hand side variable, the
model must be estimated using instrumental variables. Consider as an example the
model in Equation 1.12 where there are multiple networks with a single observation for
each network. The first stage regression of the instrumental variables model is used to
estimate the endogenous peer effect G`y∗` and is given by
G`y∗` = αxx
∗
` +αx¯G
∗
`x
∗
` +αIV (G
∗
`)
2x∗` +η
∗
` (1.16)
where the instrument is (G`)2x∗` . The square of an network adjacency matrix identifies
the friends of an individuals friends. Building on previous literature in spatial econo-
metrics, Lee (2007) suggests that higher order polynomials of the network multiplied
by exogenous covariates (i.e. G2x, G3x etc.) are valid instruments. Because each
individual’s outcome is a function of their own covariates and their friends’ covariates,
the endogenous peer effect (the effect of peer group outcomes, G`y∗` ) is a function of
the covariates of the friends of an individual’s friends, (G`)2x∗` .
In addition, the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term. Because of the strict
exogeneity assumption in Assumption 4, the instrument is a function of the observed
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network and the observed exogenous variable x∗ and is therefore uncorrelated with
the error term.16 Note that the model specification assumption has a crucial role here,
as it implies that the only variables that systematically affect an individual’s outcome
are those explicitly included in the model. In other words, it is assumed that there
are no direct effects of friends of friends, rather the only way that friends of friends
can influence the outcome is through the mutual friend.17 Because the instrument is
uncorrelated with the error term and correlated with the endogenous variable it is a valid
instrument.
I implement the instrumental variables model outlined above in two distinct and novel
ways. The first is to use the within transformations from Section 1.2 and Section 1.3
to account for individual heterogeneity and then estimate the instrumental variables
model. I do this using a Markov-Chain Monte Carlo instrumental variables estimation
procedure. The second is to estimate the model using a semi-parametric technique.
This method, proposed by Conley et al. (2008), relies on a non-parametric technique to
group observations that are likely to share a distribution for their error term. Once the
grouping is known, the parametric instrumental variables estimation proceeds using this
knowledge. Each group of observations has its own mean and variance parameters, which
means that individual heterogeneity is flexibly accounted for in the model, potentially
16By similar logic, higher order powers are also valid instruments. This could allow modeling a specific
effect for friends of friends.
17Bramoullé et al. (2009) refer to these kinds of relationships as intransitive triads, and examine through
simulation the identification properties of the model as the number of these triads change.
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even without directly accounting for an individual fixed effect. Both methods are
described in more detail below.
1.4.1 Instrumental Variables and Gibbs Sampling
Prior research in estimating these instrumental variables models suggests using a
Maximum Likelihood approach, with Lee (2007) observing that even though a conven-
tional two-stage least squares estimate is consistent, in this setting its rate of convergence
is far slower than would otherwise be expected.18 Unfortunately, the properties of these
maximum likelihood estimators are still not very well understood. Specifically, while
Lee (2007) shows that these estimators are approximately quadratic at the optimum, no
large-sample results have been established for statistical inference using parameters and
standard errors derived from the likelihood maximization. In addition, the likelihood
functions in this case can be very difficult to optimize and it is unclear whether they
always converge to a global maximum. Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013) ac-
knowledge the limitations of maximum-likelihood estimation and introduce a Bayesian
estimation strategy to estimate the reduced form of the linear-in-means model; the
method performs well, but is only implemented with a single outcome.
I pursue a Bayesian instrumental variables estimation strategy for two reasons.
First, Bayesian methods have well-established optimality results and avoid the pit-
18See also Lee et al. (2010). While not an application of social networks, Lin (2010) applies the Lee
(2007) model to identify peer effects in schools.
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falls in maximum likelihood estimation outlined above. Second, Bayesian methods
result in estimating posterior distributions for parameters that allow clear estimation
of confidence intervals and interpretation of parameters. Finally, the semi-parametric
estimation strategy I propose to resolve individual heterogeneity is a Bayesian model
where maximum-likelihood estimation is unfeasible. Estimating the panel approaches
to the peer effects models as a Bayesian instrumental variables allows more direct
comparison of the methods. Of course, Bayesian methods are not without limitations.
Specifically, estimation can be computationally intensive and requires assumptions of
prior distributions, which some researchers are reluctant to do.
Estimating the models in this paper via maximum likelihood or via Bayesian Markov-
Chain Monte Carlo methods requires a normality assumption.19 In this case, the error
terms for the first and second stage are assumed to be jointly normal with mean zero and
variance Σ
Assumption 5 (Normality of the Error Terms).
ν ,η |x∗,G∼ N(0,Σ)
Note that this assumption is not necessary for identification, which will hold as long the
exogeneity assumption is satisfied. This allows modifications of this model that vary
19It is worth noting that the Bernstein - Von Mises theorem implies that for a sufficiently large sample
the maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimates are equivalent. Consequently, if one is more comfortable
with a MLE approach, this intuition should suffice to interpret the estimates even if one is unfamiliar with
Bayesian techniques.
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this distribution assumption while maintaining identification. For example, this model
can be used to estimate binary outcomes via a probit or logit with minimal changes to
the assumptions used in the Bayesian estimation model.
I fit the instrumental variables model via Gibbs sampling, a common Bayesian
Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) technique. MCMC uses an iterative process to
estimate posterior distributions for the model parameters. Implementing this method
requires the assumption of prior distributions; in this case, the model parameters are
assumed to be normally distributed normally distributed with mean zero and a sufficiently
large variance to be considered a diffuse prior. The error term Σ is assumed to have an
Inverse-Wishart distribution. Details of these assumed distributions are specified for the
models as implemented and explained in greater depth in the online appendix.
1.4.2 Semi-Parametric Estimation
There are many scenarios where using a within transformation to account for in-
dividual heterogeneity is unfeasible. For example, panel data may not be available or
there may be concerns about time-varying individual heterogeneity. To address these
concerns, I suggest using a semi-parametric instrumental variables estimator suggested
by Conley et al. (2008). Estimating the model parameters is done using a very similar
method to the Gibbs sampling, with the exception that each observation is assumed to
have its own mean and variance so that
25
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Assumption 6 (Normality of the Error Terms: Dirichlet Process).
νi,ηi|x∗,G∼ N(µi,Σi)
To avoid estimating more parameters than there are observations, there must be some
limitations placed on the number of these parameters. In this case the distribution
parameters µi and Σi are assumed to depend on the group assignment J of the observation,
where each observation is assigned to a specific group. The group assignments are
determined endogenously via a Dirichlet Process (DP)20, J ∼ DP(λ ,JO) where λ and
J0 are the hyperparameters for the Dirichlet Process.21
The Dirichlet Process prior results in a mixture of normals, where the error term
is normally distributed but the exact distribution is determined by what group the
observation belongs to. This is done non-parametrically, through the Dirichlet Process,
while the models are traditional linear instrumental variables; hence, this technique
is semi-parametric. Note that it includes an individual mean and variance so that the
estimation process can directly account for individual level unobservables, no matter
their source. This semi-parametric technique is quite powerful, in that it requires no
ex ante assumptions about the nature of the heterogeneity beyond assuming that each
group shares a distribution family (in this case normal distribution). The process of
choosing the most likely grouping of observations naturally determines what attributes
20Also known as a Chinese Restaurant Process, this is a statistical model of group formation that has
several useful properties for Bayesian estimation.
21The prior distribution assumptions for these parameters are somewhat involved and are covered in
great detail in Conley et al. (2008); I implement this model exactly as outlined in their paper.
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of the observations most differentiate them one from another. For example, there may be
a situation where we are concerned both about individual and time period fixed effects;
however, there is insufficient data to account for both and still have enough degrees of
freedom to conduct inference. A Dirichlet Process can group observations so that the
factors that most differentiate observations from one another are accounted for, while
those that are not relevant can be ignored.22
In addition to allowing for individual level means, Conley et al. (2008) show that this
semi-parametric model has several useful features. Because it assumes each observation
has its own variance, it explicitly accounts for heteroskedasticity. Partly due to this,
simulations reveal it to be at least as efficient as many other instrumental variables
estimation techniques, including both Frequentist and Bayesian methods. Additionally,
a Dirichlet Process has natural conjugate priors so that estimation can proceed efficiently
via Gibbs sampling. This is especially true when the error is non-normal. Lastly, the
Dirichlet Process technique is demonstrated to behave well even in the case of weak
instruments.
The Dirichlet process is not without limitations. The algorithm finds groups based on
the observed data and these endogenously discovered groups may or may not reflect the
attributes that a researcher considers important. In a related concern, the algorithm may
not be able to group observations at a fine enough level to completely account for all
22For example, the Dirichlet Process might find that rather than an individual level mean it is sufficient
to account for a few group means and that all time fixed effects are unnecessary.
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the individual heterogeneity when observations are substantially different. In addition,
the semi-parametric model can be computationally intensive and may not behave well
in large datasets. There are two reasons for this. The first is that as more observations
are added to the model, sorting into groups becomes increasingly difficult. Additionally,
each group of observations requires its own draw of mean and variance parameters,
so as the number of groups increases additional computations are required within a
given iteration of the algorithm. The combination of these two problems means that the
semi-parametric method does not scale well.
Despite these limitations, the Dirichlet process semi-parametric estimation strategy
can still be a powerful tool to estimate these models due to its flexibility. Consequently,
I suggest that fixed effects transformation and semi-parametric estimation are comple-
mentary techniques, the choice of which model to estimate is likely case specific. In
most cases, estimating both as a robustness check seems prudent. In addition, there
is no reason why the methods cannot be used in tandem when the data is available.
The fixed effects model can directly account for individual fixed effects while the semi-
parametric estimation strategy can flexibly account for any remaining heterogeneity in
the observations.
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1.5 Simulations
To further explore the attributes of these estimation procedures I estimate them on a
variety of simulated networks and data to observe how they behave. The generic process
consists of generating a random network, simulating data generated from that network,
and then fitting a model using a variety of the estimation techniques suggested above.
Unless otherwise stated, outcomes are simulated 1000 times and the outcome of interest
is the endogenous peer effect. While there are many potential ways to simulate network
data, I focus on two network simulation models.
The first, Erdös-Rényi random graphs, is the most common and likely simplest
method for simulating a network. In an Erdös-Rényi random graph a link is formed
between two individuals as a draw from a Bernoulli distribution with a given link
formation probability. This means that the network can be generated very simply;
however, the resulting networks differ somewhat from social networks that are observed
in the real world.23 These networks are commonly used in the literature to benchmark the
performance of network techniques, and I use this method to ensure that the techniques
suggested in this paper perform comparably to the original method.
23Specifically, Erdös-Rényi random graphs lack the clustering that is commonly observed in real world
networks and the degree distribution (the distribution of the number of links each individual has) is
uniform, rather than the skewed “power law” distributions observed in many networks.
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Table 1.1: Random Network Simulations, Erdös-Rényi
Coverage SD Converge
IV 0.73 0.17 0.79
IV - Individual FE 0.98 0.02 0.96
IV - Ind/Net FE 0.99 0.03 0.90
Semiparametric 0.96 0.04 0.82
Semiparametric - Individual FE 0.99 0.01 0.92
Semiparametric - Ind/Net FE 1.00 0.03 0.93
The second random network generation technique, known as Exponential Random
Graph Models (ERGMs), are able to generate networks that are much more realistic.24
While the main focus of ERGMs is to statistically evaluate the likelihood of observ-
ing a given network, in doing so they establish methods for simulating networks that
have certain attributes. Specifically, ERGMs can generate networks that exhibit ho-
mophily (selection on observables) and allow each individual to have an arbitrary degree
distribution (a different number of expected links).
In Table 1.1 I show the simulated results from the scenario outlined in Section 1.2
where the network is held fixed and multiple outcomes are observed for each network. In
this case the networks are Erdös-Rényi random graphs. The top panel contains results for
the Gibbs sampling, where each row varies the kind of fixed effects that are accounted
for in each model, and the bottom panel contains results from the Dirichlet Process
24There is a large and growing literature examining the properties of ERGMs. Most of these focus
on either fitting ERGMs to observed networks or establishing properties of the estimation procedure.
Chandrasekhar and Jackson (n.d.) provide a high level introduction into these models and some of their
limitations.
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Table 1.2: Random Network Simulations, ERGM with Homophily
Coverage SD Converge
IV 0.63 0.07 0.75
IV - Individual FE 0.98 0.01 0.96
IV - Ind/Net FE 0.99 0.02 0.91
Semiparametric 1.00 0.03 0.81
Semiparametric - Individual FE 0.99 0.01 0.95
Semiparametric - Ind/Net FE 0.99 0.02 0.96
semi-parametric estimation procedure. Each group of columns specifies a different
kind of data generating process, varying the kinds of individual heterogeneity in the
model. The estimation procedures are evaluated on whether or not the final 95% highest
probability density (HPD) interval covers the true parameter (Coverage), the median
standard deviation for the estimated parameter (Precision), and whether or not the
Bayesian estimation procedure converged (Converge).25 The results of the table indicate
that both techniques are capable of estimating the correct parameters, with the Gibbs
sampling requiring the fixed effects transformations to accurately estimate the model.
As expected, the semi-parametric estimation strategy appears to function regardless of
whether or not the data has been transformed, although it is more likely to converge in
the transformed model.26
25Convergence is tested using a Geweke Test with 95% confidence. While it is expected that most of
these algorithms will have converged in distribution, due to the nature of the statistical test it is possible to
reject convergence simply due to noise in the estimated output. In other words, I expect the Convergence
diagnostic to indicate convergence roughly 95% of the time.
26This problem is due to the untransformed model having many additional groups to find in the Dirichlet
Process. Theoretically, this can be remedied in most cases by allowing the algorithm to run for more
iterations; however, in these tables I wanted to compare methods holding the number of iterations constant.
31
Chapter 1. Individual Heterogeneity and Peer Effects
Table 1.3: Random Network Simulations, ERGM with Unobserved Homophily
Coverage Precision Converge
IV 0.55 0.13 0.75
IV - Individual FE 0.90 0.01 0.93
IV - Ind/Net FE 0.90 0.03 0.93
Semiparametric 0.90 0.03 0.85
Semiparametric - Individual FE 0.92 0.01 0.95
Semiparametric - Ind/Net FE 0.92 0.02 0.91
I also implement this model when the network is generated by an ERGM that allows
for homophily. In this case, I assume that students are more likely to form links when
the value of their unobservable individual fixed effect is similar. This corresponds to
a case where the network is generated by something unobservable to the modeler, but
is accounted for in the estimation procedure by a fixed effect. Table 1.2 shows that the
estimation procedures are indeed able to correctly estimate the parameters of the model
even when the network is more sophisticated. Table 1.3 shows estimation when the
network exhibits sorting on some other attribute that is not part of the data generating
process. In this case as well, the parameters of the model are accurately estimated. Taken
together, these results suggest that the estimation procedures behave as expected and are
robust to several kinds of networks.
Additionally, I am able to fit an ERGM to the political networks in the application
to get a better idea of how the estimation procedures will behave in scenarios similar
to the empirical application. This is especially important given that congressional
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cosponsorship networks have attributes that Bramoullé et al. (2009) indicate will make
identifying peer effects more difficult, namely it is densely connected and the diameter
is small.27 Despite these attributes, simulations indicate that peer effects are precisely
identified in networks similar to the ones under consideration in the model.
Several conclusions are evident from the simulation results:
• Estimation is successful for a variety of network types
• Identification seems to hold even in networks that exhibit sorting on unobservables
• Semi-parametric estimation can account for individual heterogeneity in a single
network
• A hybrid approach yields most precise estimates in many situations
1.6 Application
Congressional voting is an ideal place to look for peer effects. Beginning with
Peltzman (1984, 1985) there is a long history in economics of using econometrics to
explain voting patterns (see also Levitt, 1996). However, the simultaneity of the voting
process has always made it difficult to study the peer effects that emerge in the voting
process. I use cosponsorship networks, combined with the results in this paper, to address
this question. Bill cosponsorship decisions provide a social network, because a decision
to cosponsor provides a clear indication that the cosponsor holds the bill and/or the bill’s
27The diameter is longest direct path between two individuals in a network.
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sponsor in high regard. The purpose of this application is to examine the properties
of the two estimation procedures outlined above on observed networks and estimate
peer effects in congressional networks. Specifically, I wish to see if the relationships
indicated by cosponsorship result in peer effects in voting, i.e. do a legislator’s friends
have a significant influence on their voting decisions?
There has been some research that attempts to estimate peer effects from a legislator’s
social interactions. These studies typically exploit some sort of exogenous variation
in whom legislators may associate with, for example Masket (2008) uses random
assignment of seats in the California assembly to show significant peer effects in an
individual’s voting outcomes based on the voting of those who sit next to them. However,
on a national level Rogowski and Sinclair (2012) are unable to identify any peer effects
in voting outcomes based on office location, which is partially determined by random
assignment.
1.6.1 Cosponsorship Networks
This section introduces the networks and data that will be used as an illustration of
the methods described above. Fowler (2006a,b) proposes and explores the idea that bill
cosponsorship represents a social network over the set of legislators in the House and
Senate. Specifically, Fowler (2006a) suggests that one formulation of the cosponsorship
network best describes the underlying social structure of Congress. This network is
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directed (links do not have to be mutual); a cosponsor i links to a sponsor j when they
choose to cosponsor the bill that j is sponsoring. Additionally, these networks are
weighted in a specific fashion. One quirk of the legislative process is that some bills have
many cosponsors, occasionally well over half of the membership.28 It is reasonable to
assume in these cases that cosponsorship is a less meaningful connection, both because a
cosponsor is now one of many cosponsors and because there is an increasing likelihood
that they may be notified of the bill by someone other than the original sponsor. The
weighted relationship
Ai j =
B
∑
b=1
wi jb
cb
, (1.17)
gives the i jth element of an adjacency matrix A by summing wi jb, an indicator if
representative i cosponsored j’s bill for each bill b (note that the indicator is zero if j
did not sponsor the bill in question). Each bill is weighted by the number of cosponsors
cb on the bill. This metric implies close connections between legislators i and j if they
cosponsor each other’s bills frequently and if there are few other cosponsors on these
bills, and a weak relationship if they rarely (if ever) cosponsor each other’s bills and
when they do there are many cosponsors.
Cosponsorship networks are built on the idea that cosponsoring a bill is a clear signal
of a relationship between the cosponsor and the sponsor. Since many bills are introduced
28This is one way to ensure that the bill makes it to the floor and will pass. Additionally, legislation
that is widely popular with the public often has many cosponsors, which allows legislators to claim credit
when up for reelection.
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in a legislative session, repeated cosponsorship is a strong signal of a connection from
the cosponsor to the bill’s sponsor.29 Fowler (2006a) describes several key attributes of
cosponsorship networks; they tend to be denser and more closely connected than other
social networks that are commonly observed.30 While a cosponsorship relationship is
directed, Fowler also notes a strong tendency for reciprocal cosponsorship, meaning that
Ai j and A ji tend to be correlated though not exactly equal to one another.
The cosponsorship networks from the 93rd to the 110th Congresses are combined
with roll-call voting data from the same time period. The outcome variable of interest is
voting yes on a bill; this outcome is aggregated over the entire congressional session
(or smaller interval of time if desired) so that the final dependent variable is the total
number of yea votes for each legislator in each period. Initially, I focus on a single
covariate, an individual’s ideology as measured by Poole and Rosenthal (2000). The
exact variable used is the number of predicted yea votes, i.e. how would an individual
with this ideology vote on the issue at hand?31 This measure has several key benefits.
First, it varies across every bill, which makes for a stronger relationship than most other
29The exact nature of the relationship is unclear, it may be a set of common ideas, a strategic political
choice, or reveal an actual friendship. For the purposes of this application, the exact meaning of the
relationship is unimportant. It is the fact that the relationships exist and vary in intensity that is crucial to
identify peer effects based on this social network.
30More closely connected in this context indicates that these networks have a small diameter.
31The Poole and Rosenthal system is based on the idea of ideal points, that each legislator has an ideal
point and prefers legislation that lies closest to this point. The estimation procedure to find these predicted
votes takes into account each legislators voting history and then observes how everyone else voted on the
bill. Based on these votes, the model will predict a yea or a nay vote for that legislator. This model is able
to predict the correct vote 90% of the time without any additional information about the representatives.
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attributes that may affect voting (which do not change or change very rarely). Second, it
avoids the problem of needing to know the content of the bill. Since bill content can
vary widely, a yea vote means different things depending on the context. This holds
even if the general topic of the bill is known, i.e. voting yea on a budget bill implies very
different things depending on whether or not the bill increases or decreases spending.
Third, using this variable in the regression model represents a crude rational expectations
model, where legislators know how everyone else is likely to vote.32 In this context a
peer effect represents deviations from a legislator’s expected behavior attributable to the
choice of his or her friends to also deviate from expected behavior.
In Subsection 1.6.3, I consider some other covariates including which party controls
the chamber and the representative’s seniority. Being a member of the party in power is
much more likely to have predictive power than simple party identification (Democrat
or Republican) for explaining yea votes because the majority party is able to set the
legislative agenda through their disproportionate control of committee and chamber
leadership positions. This power results in significant influence over which bills make
it out of committee and onto the floor for a vote.33 Note that when the model with the
individual within transformation is estimated, time-invariant individual attributes cannot
be separated from this effect; consequently, party identification, race, and gender cannot
32When a roll-call vote is made, voting is public so legislators are aware of who already voted and what
they chose to do.
33This idea is set out in Cox and McCubbins (2005), a prominent work in the study of the Congress.
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be included when estimating a fixed effect model. This problem is especially salient
when considering only a single Congress. While there are a few individuals who did
switch parties in this time period, this did not happen frequently enough to separately
identify the parameters. Additionally, in the roll-call data representatives who switch
party are treated as two separate individuals making it difficult to pursue this strategy.
The details of how cosponsorship matrices are derived and how the roll call votes
data were prepared are available in Section A.2.
1.6.2 A Single Congress
In many ways the cosponsorship networks combined with congressional voting
provide an ideal setting to demonstrate the methods proposed here. A congressional
vote is a decision where peers have strong incentives to influence one another and it
is intuitive to try to model this as an endogenous peer effect. These bills are plausibly
independent from one another, because bills presented one after another are seldom
related. Extending this idea, it seems reasonable to assume that the set of bills voted
on over a short period of time are independent from bills voted on over a different
short period of time. To improve the likelihood that the network is unrelated to the
unobservable attributes that explain voting this period, the cosponsorship network from
the previous Congress is used.34 Additionally, this network reflects extant social ties and
34This means that new legislators who do not have cosponsorship information from the previous period
are dropped from the analysis. Retention rates in the sample are typically between 85% and 95% so
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avoids the complication of observing cosponsorship ties that are part of the legislative
process that also produced the legislation up for roll-call vote.
Estimation of the basic model with a single covariate and a single congress proceeds
via Gibbs sampling as outlined in Section 1.4. In this case, the outcome is the number
of yea votes cast in a given month of the 110th legislative session. The Gibbs samplers
for both the conventional instrumental variables estimate and the Dirichlet Process are
initialized with a burn-in period of 10000 observations to minimize the impact of the
initial values and run for 100,000 repetitions, keeping every 10th sample to minimize
autocorrelation in the posterior sample. Diffuse priors are chosen for all of the parameters
estimated in the model, all regression coefficients are assumed to be mean 0 with variance
1000. The Inverse-Wishart prior is also given diffuse prior values. The Dirichlet Process
priors are left as explained in Conley et al. (2008). Additional information about the
implementation of the algorithms is available in the online appendix.
The results for the simple model are contained in Table 1.4, with each column group
accounting for an additional fixed effect.35 The effect of interest (“Vote Peer Effect”) is
estimated at approximately 0.3 once the fixed effects are accounted for, indicating that if
the legislator’s friends mean number of yea votes increases by 1 that legislator’s number
of yea votes is likely to increase by 0.3 holding everything else constant. The effect of
relatively little data is lost based on this decision. However, this does mean that Freshman legislators,
who may be particularly susceptible to social pressure, are never included in the sample.
35Note that all of these models were estimated using both the local and global within transformation to
account for contextual effects. The differences between them are minimal, the global transformation is
presented here.
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the predicted vote is approximately 0.9, which is consistent with it being an accurate
predictor of representatives votes. The exogenous peer effect in this case is the effect of
the an representative’s peer’s predicted votes on an representative’s votes. The negative
coefficient in this case indicates that increasing the number of predicted “yea” votes of a
legislator’s friends leads to a decrease in the number of “yea” votes the legislators cast.
This somewhat counter-intuitive result may be explained if the regression is thought
of as explaining deviations from expected behavior; a change in the observed votes of
an individual’s friends (the endogenous peer effect) must be offset by a negative effect
of the number of predicted votes (the exgoenous peer effect).36 In addition, Figure 1.1
contains the vote peer effect estimate for each of the 94th-110th Senates. Note that there
are statistically significant positive peer effects in most Senates, but the magnitude of
the peer effect varies widely over time. The causes of these fluctuations is an interesting
question that is left for future research.
1.6.3 Multiple Congresses
While it may seem implausible that cosponsorship networks are independent across
congressional sessions, this assumption may be more valid than initially suspected. First,
the assumption is not that the networks are completely independent, rather it is that,
conditional on the explanatory variables used in the model, links appear seemingly
36This issue is avoided in subsequent results over multiple networks where other variables are available
to serve as an isntrument.
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Figure 1.1: Peer Effects in the 94th-110th Senates
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at random. This places much more weight on correctly specifying the model, but
it is certainly possible to include as many individual attributes as we think might
affect network formation. Second, elections between sessions can be treated as quasi-
exogenous shocks to House and Senate membership. Changing the memberships will
necessarily affect the structure of the network, indeed Fowler (2006a) shows that there
are significant differences in cosponsorship networks across legislative sessions.
The results using multiple Congresses and a single covariate are reported in Ta-
ble 1.5.37 The outcome in these models is the sum of yea votes cast in a congressional
session. In this case the model is run with two different instruments. The first (the “weak”
instrument) is an indicator variable for the party that is in power. For reasons discussed
earlier, this is expected to increase the number of yea votes in a given legislative session
and a representative votes yea far more often as a member of the party in power; however,
it also does not vary within a Congressional session and therefore is uninformative in
that setting. The second instrument (the “strong” instrument) is the number of bills
voted on that are sponsored by a member of your party. This variable conveys similar
information as the party in power (presumably the party in power is able to bring more of
their bills to a vote), but it also contains additional information about how well the party
in power was able to impose its will. While both instruments should yield approximately
the same parameter on the endogenous peer effect, the weak instrument in the classic
37These models account for both individual and congress level fixed effects.
43
Chapter 1. Individual Heterogeneity and Peer Effects
Ta
bl
e
1.
5:
94
th
-1
10
th
C
on
gr
es
s:
Vo
tin
g
Pe
er
E
ff
ec
ts
G
ib
bs
Sa
m
pl
e
D
ir
ic
hl
et
Pr
oc
es
s
C
oe
f
SD
lo
w
er
up
pe
r
C
oe
f
SD
lo
w
er
up
pe
r
W
ea
k
In
st
ru
m
en
t
Vo
te
Pe
er
E
ff
ec
t
0.
19
0
0.
12
3
−0
.0
76
0.
41
6
0.
15
9
0.
09
3
−0
.0
17
0.
33
3
Pa
rt
y
In
Po
w
er
19
.6
73
2.
31
3
15
.2
76
24
.5
00
22
.1
86
2.
09
0
18
.3
69
26
.3
24
Pa
rt
y
In
Po
w
er
Pe
er
E
ff
ec
t
8.
88
3
6.
65
8
−5
.8
07
20
.1
58
19
.2
73
7.
57
1
4.
85
0
34
.3
56
St
ro
ng
In
st
ru
m
en
t
Vo
te
Pe
er
E
ff
ec
t
0.
16
4
0.
05
4
0.
05
8
0.
27
3
0.
08
7
0.
05
4
−0
.0
30
0.
18
3
Sp
on
so
ri
n
Pa
rt
y
0.
33
7
0.
01
0
0.
31
6
0.
35
7
0.
33
8
0.
00
9
0.
31
9
0.
35
4
Sp
on
so
ri
n
Pa
rt
y
Pe
er
E
ff
ec
t
−0
.1
42
0.
04
4
−0
.2
27
−0
.0
58
−0
.0
62
0.
04
2
−0
.1
43
0.
02
2
44
Chapter 1. Individual Heterogeneity and Peer Effects
Gibbs sampling is unable to precisely estimate the coefficient. The Dirichlet Process
appears to perform better, with the 95% Highest Probability Density (HPD) interval
only just containing 0 and returning a coefficient that is closer to the estimates for the
stronger instrument case.
I next estimate the model across congresses with multiple exogenous variables. Note
that in this case, each variable x is included as an explanatory variable, an exogenous peer
effect Gx, and an instrument G2x which means that the model is over-identified.38 The
new variables are time in office and the ideology score. Neither variable substantially
impacts the variables of interest. Time in office, measured in weeks, is significant both
on its own and as a peer effect, where legislators who have been in office longer or
have friends that have been in office longer are less likely to vote yes. Ideology score
is insignificant, both as a covariate and a peer effect, likely because its effect varies
depending on which party is in control of the chamber.
Using the methods derived in the paper, I am able to show that there are significant
peer effects in congressional voting. These effects are observable within a single
congress, where the network is given as the co-sponsorship relationships from the
previous congressional session, and across legislative sessions. While the magnitude
of the peer effect varies somewhat across specifications, the sign is consistent and the
38It is not necessary to include an explanatory variable in all three roles; however, there are reasons to
prefer to do so. If the variable belongs in the model as its own effect, it is likely to have an effect through
peers as well. This is especially important in variables such as income or race, where a high degree of
social sorting occurs. The exogenous peer effects in these cases explicitly accounts for selection based on
these characteristics in the model.
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size of the effect is plausible. Methodologically, both methods yield results that are
consistent with each other, lending credence to the idea that both estimation strategies
are identifying the same effect.
1.7 Conclusion
I have presented two methods for dealing with individual heterogeneity in peer
effects estimation with endogenous groups. The first, using panel methods applied to
multiple networks, is able to control for individual and time period specific fixed effects
and scales well to large networks; however, it requires repeated observations in networks
and strong assumptions about the network formation process. The Semi-Parametric
method can be implemented in a single network and is potentially able to account for
individual heterogeneity that is not time-invariant, but is computationally intensive and
does not scale well to large networks. Both estimation procedures work well in many
settings, and often work best if fixed effects are accounted for and the model is estimated
using the semi-parametric technique. I demonstrate these properties using simulated
networks and then use both models to estimate peer effects in Congressional voting.
These methods can be useful in any setting where peer effects are to be estimated,
especially when the peer groups are potentially endogenous. For example, online
social networks fit in this framework of repeated observations of a network along with
47
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outcomes of interest. Peer effects may also arise in purchasing decisions: how much
more likely are friends to purchase an item given that that their friend mentioned buying
it? Alternatively, consider a high school with a given social structure. Observing daily
attendance would allow estimation of peer effects in school truancy, i.e. how much more
likely is a student to miss school if their friends miss school?
Two avenues for further development of the peer effects model introduced in this
work may prove especially fruitful. The first is to relax the independence across outcomes
assumption to allow for time series effects when there are repeated outcomes on a fixed
network. Similarly, it may be useful to merge the ideas of Section 1.2 and Section 1.3,
so that we can look at multiple outcomes across multiple networks. The second avenue
for future research is to integrate insights from the literature regarding longitudinal
networks. Models of longitudinal network formation such as longitudinal ERGMs or
SIENA39 assume that networks continuously evolve over time and are only observed at
discrete points. Such models are atheoretical, in that they do not assume any specific
network formation process, but provide a basic statistical model of how networks may
evolve. Combining these models with the peer effect identification procedure may
provide insights into situations where a network is allowed to vary continuously.
Peer effects estimation is becoming increasingly important as technology increases
the availability of network data. While much remains to be done, this paper has provided
39See http://www.stats.ox.ac.uk/~snijders/siena/siena_r.htm for information
about SIENA modeling.
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two practical empirical frameworks for estimating peer effects when panel data from
social networks is available. By explicitly modeling individual level heterogeneity as part
of peer effects estimation, I have been able to loosen the strict exogeneity assumption of
network formation and demonstrate the usefulness of these techniques on simulated and
observed network data.
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2.1 Introduction
Social influences, commonly referred to as peer effects, potentially have a large
impact on individual decision making. One area in which peer effects have recently
begun to receive attention is in micro-lending, especially because many microfinance
progams have begun exploring group lending programs. The Diffusion of Microfinance
(DoM) project examines take up of microfinance loans by looking at how information
diffused among networks in villages in Southern India. DoM focuses on an experimental
intervention where only certain individuals are told about the microfinance program,
which allows for modeling the take-up of these individuals and their social contacts. I
exploit this variation in information, along with data about social networks sampled from
the villages, to estimate the effect of an individual’s friends’ decisions to participate
in microfinance on that individual’s take up of microfinance. I show, using novel
network-based estimation strategies, that there are strong peer effects in microfinance
participation: an additional friend choosing to participate in the program increases the
likelihood that a household participates in the program by 6%-10%. These results persist
across a variety of robustness checks, in which careful attention is paid to differentiating
the peer effect in take-up from sorting based on observable attributes.
In addition to the substantive contribution of estimating a peer effect in microfi-
nance participation, this work demonstrates the advantages of network based estimation
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strategies in the identification of peer effects. Network approaches resolve the reflection
problem and identification of the peer effect holds even when friendship formation is
allowed to be endogenous, as long as the model is correctly specified. These critical
specification assumptions are explored in detail, including applying recent advances in
peer effects estimation that can account for unobserved individual heterogeneity. I also
demonstrate techniques for estimating unbiased peer effects when the network data is
incomplete. Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012) shows that using sampled network data
can results in significant biases in peer effect estimates; however, they also establish that
these biases can be eliminated or minimized through analytic corrections and graphical
reconstruction. Additionally, graphical reconstruction allows the inclusion of statistics
about network that would be biased in a sampled network. This allows me to use network
centrality to control for the probability that an individual is informed about the program.
These results help to resolve a discrepancy between the microfinance literature, which
tends to show that there are significant positive peer effects in repayment decisions (Li
et al., 2013; Breza, n.d.; Giné and Karlan, 2014), with the results of Chandrasekhar
and Lewis (2012) which finds an insignificant or possibly negative peer effect on
microfinance take-up using the DoM data. Using a more detailed specification that
Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012), I show that including a variety of individual and peer
group covariates leads to estimation of positive and statistically significant peer effects
in take-up decisions, consistent with prior findings regarding repayment.
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I introduce the Diffusion of Microfinance project in Section 2.2 and review some
recent findings about peer influences in microfinance. Section 2.3 gives background
on social networks and outlines how they can be use to estimate peer effects. The
primary results are contained in Section 2.4, along with the results for several alternative
explanations. Section 2.5 introduces the idea of graphical reconstruction to address
sampling error in networks and provides upper and lower bounds for the estimates given
a variety of configurations for the missing links. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
The focus of this work is to estimate a peer effect on participation in a microfinance
program. In other words, how much more likely is an individual to take up a loan if
their friends also take up a loan? Not only does this provide insight into the effects
of friendship on individual behavior, but it also helps microfinance institutions better
understand the dynamics of their interventions.
2.2.1 Diffusion of Microfinance
Previous work in this area has shown that social networks are very important to
the implementation of microfinance lending programs. The Diffusion of Microfinance
project (DoM) is a randomized experiment that attempts to determine how information
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about a new lending program spreads through a village.1 Prior to entering the village,
DoM surveys approximately half of the villagers about their social interactions and
other demographic characteristics. The microfinance institution then enters a village
by contacting a few prominent individuals (referred to as leaders) and inviting them to
inform their friends about the new program. Although the method of entering a village
was common across all the villages, the actual take up of the program varied widely,
with approximately 5% of households participating in one village with participation
nearing 50% in another.
A few research findings regarding take up of microfinance have already been estab-
lished using this data.2 Banerjee et al. (2013) shows that the primary determinant of
program take-up rates is how prominent the informed individuals are in the village social
structure, as measured by a concept called centrality, and examines the performance
of various measures of centrality in predicting diffusion. They also fit a contagion
model that explains how information is passed from person to person. Chandrasekhar
and Lewis (2012) uses the DoM data to make several methodological contributions
(including results regarding peer effects estimators) about using network data that are
derived from a sampled network.
1The data for this project has been made available online, see Banerjee et al. (2014).
2These villages and the DoM data have been used in other settings as well, for an empirical example of
a favor trading model (Jackson et al., 2012), as the site of various experiments including some regarding
social insurance (Chandrasekhar et al., 2011a,b) and investment decisions (Breza et al., 2013).
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While I also use the DoM data, there are several substantive differences in the
analysis below. First, the primary concern of Banerjee et al. (2013) is a village level
outcome: how does information about the program (proxied by takeup decisions) diffuse
through the village? Whereas I am interested in the individual level, isolating the effect
of friendship on takeup decisions. Second, the focus of Chandrasekhar and Lewis
(2012) is methodological and the peer effect estimation is primarily to demonstrate the
feasibility of their techniques. Relatively little attention is paid to the specification of
the model, even though this is critical to the identification assumptions for estimating
peer effects. Most importantly, the peer effect models in that work contain a single
covariate which is insufficient to fully account for all of the individual attributes that
might affect microfinance take-up. One reason that they may focus on a single covariate
is that this variable, “whether or not the household was informed” about microfinance
is assigned by the experimenter. While random assignment can often allow consistent
estimation of peer effects when peer groups are also randomly assigned, this is not the
case when network ties are determined endogenously. What may appear to be a peer
effect may actually be due to factors that are unaccounted for in the model that affect
who individuals choose as friends.3 Consequently, the identified effect was negative
and usually statistically insignificant. In contrast, I find significant positive peer effects
3This idea is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4
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combining more robust model specifications with several of the techniques proposed by
Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012).
2.2.2 Peer Effects in Microfinance
Peer effects in microfinance decisions are an area of substantial interest, but there
are often difficulties in getting the data necessary to properly estimate them. Using
networks and the unique structure of the DoM program, I am able show that there are
significant social influences in areas of micro-lending that have not been studied in depth.
Much of the work to date has primarily been concerned with repayment, rather than take
up, of microcredit.4 Microfinance institutions have begun investigating group, rather
than individual, liability in loans. The initial results seem to show little difference in
repayment rates (see Attanasio et al. (2011) and Giné and Karlan (2014)), which would
seem to indicate that social pressure in this context has minimal effect. However, these
results are tempered by the fact that individuals are selecting into microfinance programs
based on the knowledge of the liability arrangement.
Results that examine unexpected changes in repayment probability yield much
stronger estimates of peer effect estimation. Giné et al. (2011) exploits an exogenous
shock on the probability of repayment under group liability by exploiting a religious
declaration that all Muslims in a province in India should stop repaying microfinance
4Banerjee (2013) contains a nice review of the current state of the microfinance literature. I focus here
only on those studies that explore peer effects and influences.
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loans. They find that Muslim dominated groups defaulted at higher rates than Hindu
dominated groups, a result at least partially attributable to social pressure. Intriguingly,
Breza et al. (2013) exploits a similar policy enacted by the state of Andhra Pradesh
which encouraged all its citizens to default on microfinance loans. Despite these loans
being subject to individual liability (and the policy being independent of religion), Breza
demonstrates that having all of one’s peers in an investment group repay resulted in a
10%-15% increase in the probability that an individual repaid their own loan. Similar
results are shown by Li et al. (2013) who explore peer effects in repayment to group-
lending program using a structural model. They demonstrate that if all members of the
group fully repaid, the probability that an individual in that group repaid increases by
about 12%. Although methodlogically distinct, my estimates of peer effects in take-up
are similar to these estimates of repayment.
While there has been relatively little work regarding microfinance take-up, there is
a large literature indicating that peer influences are important for individuals making
investment decisions.5 This includes results from a variety of controlled experiments
(Duflo and Saez, 2003; Beshears et al., 2011; Bursztyn et al., 2014) and observational
studies such as (Hong et al., 2004, 2005; Brown et al., 2008). I contribute to this
literature by providing an examination of peer effects specific to microlending decisions.
Additionally, this is among the first studies to use networks to identify these peer effects.
5There is obviously a large literature identifying peer effects in a variety of settings, a review of which
is beyond the scope of this work.
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2.3 Estimating Peer Effects in Networks
2.3.1 Networks
A network consists of a set of nodes and set of links between them. In this setting, a
network consists of households (nodes) in a village in India with links between them
defined as whether or not individuals in the household indicate they are friends.6 A
network is often represented by an adjacency matrix (A), where Ai j indicates if household
i and j are friends. The row-vector ai indicates all of the friends of individual i. Network
links can also be weighted, for example by a count of how often two individuals interact,
to indicate that some links may be more important than others. Although the networks
provided by DoM are undirected, meaning that the presence of a link Ai j implies the
presence of A ji, networks can also be directed.7 In practice this means that friendships
are not required to be reciprocal.
One of the primary concerns in peer effects estimation is missing data in the network.
While the DoM project has a census of households (meaning that no nodes are missing
from the network), the network links are sampled for only a subset of this population.8
6The specific definition of friendships in this setting are discussed in detail in Subsection 2.4.1
7It may be preferable to estimate peer effects using a directed network as it makes the conditions for
identification easier to satisfy, but the data is only available as an undirected network. In working drafts
of the paper, Banerjee et al. (2013) argue that while the questions eliciting the network are directional,
i.e. who do you borrow rice from, the communication opportunity is bidirectional. Additionally, they
contend that since many of the links are reciprocated, along with the fact that questions about relatives
and the questions about friendship have roughly the same rate of reciprocity, that lack of reciprocity is
likely measurement error.
8See Section 2.4 for a detailed description of how the data is collected.
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(A) (B)
Figure 2.1: This figure shows the effect of sampling schemes on a given network.
The complete network is in (A) and the sampled nodes are highlighted in gray with
unsampled nodes in black. Panel (B) shows the links that are in the “star” subgraph,
the network that results from only observing links nominated by sampled individuals.
Observe that there are no links between black nodes, they can only link to gray nodes
when the gray node nominates them as a friend.
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For this subset, the network is egocentrically sampled, meaning that an individual lists
all of their friends from the known set of all villagers. Figure 2.1 shows an example
of an egocentric sample of the network. Panel (b) shows the complete network, with
the sampled subset highlighted in gray. Panel (d) highlights the links that are observed
in the sample. The key insight of Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012) for estimating
peer effects in this kind of sample is that we know all of the friends of the sampled
individuals; consequently, peer effects can be estimated using the “star” sub-network
shown in panel (e) as long as we only model peer effects for those whose complete
friendship list is observed (the red nodes in the figure).9 It is important to note that
using this analytical correction requires that non-network data (individual covariates
beyond the friendship links) be observed for all individuals in the network. Without this
data it is impossible estimate exogenous peer effects properly. While this may seem
like a restrictive condition, this data can be obtained in a variety of ways. For example,
surveyed individuals can provide information about the friends that they have nominated.
In the case of DoM, there are a set of variables observed for all households in the village
which will be the primary data source for the analysis herein.
An additional method for dealing with sampled data suggested by Chandrasekhar and
Lewis (2012) is graphical reconstruction. Graphical reconstruction consists of predicting
whether or not links between two non-sampled individuals are likely to form. While
9In the star subgraph, the only links that are not observed are those between two individuals who are
not sampled.
60
Chapter 2. Microfinance Peer Effects
Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012) do this with a simple logit model, I instead choose to
simulate multiple networks that share the observed attributes of the sampled network.
This allows me to bound the estimates above and below, giving guidance as to what the
effect might be for a variety of possibilities for the missing links. This is discussed in
detail in Section 2.5.
2.3.2 Peer Effects Model
The linear-in-means peer effects model was popularized by Manski (1993) and has
subsequently been explored in a variety of contexts. This model takes the form:
yiv = α+β y¯(i)+ γxi+δ x¯(i)+λv+ εiv (2.1)
where an individual’s outcome is a function of their peer group’s mean outcome y¯(i)
(“the endogenous peer effect”), an individual observable xi, and the peer group’s mean
observable x¯(i) (the “exogenous peer effect”).10 Manski’s original insight (as well as
subsequent work by Moffitt et al. (2001)) is one of non-identification, i.e. that it is
impossible to separately identify parameters on the endogenous and the exogenous
peer effect. There are three reasons for this: the reflection problem (an individual’s
outcome enters on both sides of the model), contextual effects (individuals in a peer
group may share unobservable shocks that can be confounded with peer effects), and
10Manski (1993) originally calculated peer effects as containing individual i; however, subsequent work
(see Moffitt et al. (2001) suggests a formulation where individual i is excluded from calculating the mean.
I follow the second convention here, where y¯(i)) is the mean of the peer group excluding individual i.
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endogenous group membership (individuals may select peer groups because they share
similar attributes). Any attempt to estimate peer effects must credibly address these three
problems. Consequently, a variety of approaches have been developed to resolve them,
including varying group sizes (Lee, 2007), variance-covariance restrictions (Graham,
2008), properties of binary response models (Brock and Durlauf, 2007), and social
networks (Bramoullé et al., 2009; De Giorgi et al., 2010).
Bramoullé et al. (2009) shows that peer effects can be separately identified using a
social network as a peer group as long as the social network has certain properties.11
This result nests the results of Manski (1993), Moffitt et al. (2001), and Lee (2007) as
special cases and shares the identification properties of those models. Additionally, as
long as multiple networks are observed, it is possible to account for contextual effects
using a network level fixed effect. Formally the condition for identification is that
an identity matrix, the adjacency matrix, and the adjacency matrix squared must be
linearly independent. In practice, this means that the network must posses intransitive
triads, sets of three individuals in an undirected network where individual i is connected
to individual j and j is connected to k, but i is not connected to k.12 Additionally, a
sufficient condition is that the longest “shortest’ path (known as a geodesic) between any
11Although similar results were proven by De Giorgi et al. (2010), I rely on the formulation and results
of Bramoullé et al. (2009) through the remainder of this paper.
12An intransitive triad is contrasted with a triangle, where all individuals are connected. The conditions
for a directed network are slightly different, but because the networks in question are not directed, these
conditions will not be explored in this work.
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two individuals has length longer than two (or three in the case of the model including
fixed effects).13 This condition is satisfied in all of the networks in question.14
Importantly, the Bramoullé et al. (2009) framework allows for network links to
be endogenous (formed on the basis of observable attributes); however, this requires
the assumption that the attributes that affect network formation are included in the
model. If they are not, the peer effect estimation may simply be identifying the effect
of sorting along unobserved attributes and the estimate will be biased. Prior research
using microfinance (as well as the DoM project specifically) has done little to explore
this specification problem. My primary contribution in this paper is to carefully address
how the peer effects models are specified, relying on previous results regarding social
networks to resolve the reflection problem and contextual factors. This is done by
explicitly controlling for peer observable attributes showing that effects persist across a
variety of specifications of the network. I also put forth a placebo test to show that the
peer effects identified are not simply due to endogenous sorting. Additionally, relying
on the results of Banerjee et al. (2013), I specify the model using network centrality as
a proxy for the probability of being informed. This is important to show that the peer
effect is not due simply to a higher likelihood of being informed about the program;
13The longest geodesic is calculated by identifying the shortest path between all possible combinations
of nodes. If a geodesic exists that is longer than 2, there exists at least one intransitive triad.
14Because the networks are sampled the longest geodesic is difficult to calculate, since many links are
missing which may facilitate shorter paths between individuals. However, the longest geodesic even when
restricting the network to only sampled individuals is still at least 4 in all cases (it is at least 6 when using
the star sub-networks). Additionally, the conditions are satisfied in the graphically reconstructed networks,
which should be similar to the whole network.
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however, this requires special care when using a sampled network to ensure that the
network statistics are estimated properly.
Peer effects must also be estimated using a instrumental variables strategy because
the outcomes appear on both sides of the model. Following work in spatial econometrics,
Bramoullé et al. (2009) suggests that the adjacency matrix raised to a power and then
multiplied an exogenous covariate vector is a valid instrument. This exploits the fact
that the square of an adjacency matrix returns a matrix indicating the friends of an
individual’s friends. Since every individual’s outcome in a peer effects model is a
function of their friend’s attributes, this is a valid instrument as long as friends of
friends do not directly affect an individual. If this is the case, friends of friends only
influence an individual through the individual’s friends’ outcomes. While the proper
estimation strategy is a matter of some dispute, Lee (2007) and Bramoullé et al. (2009)
prefer maxmium likelihood estimation while Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens (2013)
suggest Bayesian models, I rely on two stage least squares (2SLS). The results vary
little depending on the estimation technique; however, one reason to prefer 2SLS in
this setting is computational feasibility, as the graphical reconstruction process requires
estimating the model many times. Additionally, while the results should apply generally,
Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012) only prove the efficacy of their corrections for 2SLS
and Generalized Method of Moments estimators.
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2.4 Data and Results
A microfinance institution was considering expansion to 77 villages in the Karanataka
state in India. Prior to expansion, DoM collected data from these villages including a
complete household census and a detailed survey to a random sample of approximately
half of the households in all of these villages. This survey collected comprehensive
demographic information and asked about a variety of social interactions from which it
is possible to create a social network. The microfinance institution subsequently entered
a subset of the villages and documented which households had members participate in
the microfinance program.
It is important to note that the social network data (and detailed demographic data)
have significant limitations. The first is that they are sampled on an individual level, but
the outcome is observed only on a household level. Consequently, friendship networks
are aggregated to a household level by defining two households as linked if any indi-
viduals within the household report being linked to an individual in another household.
The second is the missing data problem, as nonsampled individuals’ friendship lists are
likely missing or incomplete (because the network is undirected, if a sampled individual
nominates them as a friend this relationship is contained in the data). As discussed
in Subsection 2.3.1, I resolve this by focusing the analysis on the star subgraph, the
sampled individuals and their complete list of friends.
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Because the full set of covariates is only available for a subset of individuals in each
network, I focus on the covariates available from the census of households. Summary
statistics for these variables are available in Table 2.1.15 These variables include whether
or not the household contains a leader,16 housing information (# of rooms in the house,
# of beds in the house, electricity indicators and latrine indicators), household covariates
(caste17 and whether or not the household was surveyed), and eigenvector centrality.18.
There are many observations missing caste data, including some entire villages. Caste is
a strong indicator of friendship links and likely has an impact on microfinance take up;
consequently, I proceed estimating models both for the entire sample (omitting caste
entirely) and for the subsample where caste is completely observed in the village. This
cuts the sample roughly in half.
2.4.1 Estimating Peer Effects
In this context, a network consists of a set of households with links defined between
them depending on how they responded to a series of questions. These questions include
15Many variables of interest are available only in the detailed sample, including household gender
composition (the microfinance institution primarily works with women), household savings, and labor
market status.
16Leaders are defined teachers, politicians, or self-help group leaders. The microfinance group selected
some of these to recruit individuals to the program.
17Note that religion would presumably have an effects in these models; however, over 95% of the
sample is Hindu with a significant Muslim population in only a few villages.
18Eigenvector centrality is shown by Banerjee et. al. 2013 to best reflect how closely an individual is
linked to others in the network and that it is highly correlated with being informed about the program.
Since I am most interested in take up, rather than informational diffusion, I will use this as a control
variable. The centrality measure is discussed in detail in Section 2.5
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questions about exchange (who would you borrow kerosene from?) and social interaction
(who do you go to for advice?).19 Following Banerjee et al (2013), I use the network that
is identified by taking the union of all the possible relationships.20 In other words, in the
adjacency matrix Ai j = 1 if individual i answers yes to any of the possible link questions.
Additionally, recall that this matrix is undirected, Ai j = A ji, meaning that all links are
assumed to be reciprocal. As outlined in Subsection 2.3.2, peer effects are identified
because the friendship networks in question satisfy the requirements of Bramoullé et al.
(2009).
2.4.2 Primary Specification
I estimate the following peer effects model:
yiv = α+β∑
j 6=i
aiy jv+ γxi+δ∑
j 6=i
aix jv+λv+ εiv (2.2)
where ai is a vector (the ith row the the adjacency matrix) where the jth element indicates
if individual i is friends with individual j. The coefficient β is the endogenous peer
effect, the effect of an individual’s friends’ choices on the individual’s outcome. In
19A complete list of questions is available in Section B.1.
20This likely represents the most accurate representation of the true network. The fact of the matter
is that specifying friendship networks is fraught with difficulty and all decisions have trade offs, i.e.
assuming friendships are reciporical could mean that some links are overcounted because they are only
valued by one person but omitting these links is just trading for another kind of measurement error. One
indication that these effects are robust to this kind of measurement error is that they persist when using a
variety of different questions to proxy for the network. I do not report these because it is possible that
one specific network fits better by chance, and I do not wish to mine the data to find the network that fits
“best.”
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this case, this is the effect of a household’s friends taking a microfinance loan on the
likelihood that the household takes a microfinance loan. This is contrasted with the
exogenous peer effect δ , which is the effect of an individual’s friends observables on the
outcome.21 For example, how much more likely is a household to take up microfinance
if their friends are leaders in the village? Depending on the specification, I also include
a village fixed effect λv. It should also be noted that I make a significant deviation from
the traditional peer effects model, in that I consider the endogenous peer effect to be
the sum of an individual’s friends’ outcomes (rather than the mean). This is primarily
done to facilitate interpretation: β represents the effect of one additional friend taking
up microfinance.22
The results of estimating equation (1) using a two stage least squares approach to
account for the endogenous right hand side variable for the whole sample as well as the
subsample where caste is observed are contained in Table 2.2. Column (1) replicates
the results of Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012) that find no or a potentially negative
peer effect using a single covariate.23 However, including individual and peer group
21In the analysis below, I include an exogenous peer effect for every individual covariate in the model.
While this is not strictly necessary, it is good practice to include them to ensure that these effects are not
confounded with the endogenous peer effect.
22A mean for the endogenous peer effect is easily obtained by row-normalizing the adjacency matrix
(dividing a row of the matrix by the sum of the elements of the row). These results yield similar statistical
significance and marginal effects of coefficients, although the magnitudes change due to the differing
interpretation.
23The results do not match exactly, but are very similar. This is likely due to slight differences in the
composition of the sample (the program has become available in additional villages since the original
paper was written, but it is not apparentwhich villages these are.). Additionally, I am limited to observing
leader status, which is only strongly correlated with being informed, while the Chandrasekhar and Lewis
(2012) use a stronger measure (“whether or not an individual is informed”) as their covariate.
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covariates (exogenous peer effects) to properly specify the model indicate a large and
statistically significant peer effect in take up of microfinance. One additional friend
taking a microfinance loan increases the probability that an individual participates by
about 7%.
The coefficients on the covariates fit with expectation. Leaders are more likely to
participate in the microfinance program, which reflects their informational advantage as
a subset of these individuals were targeted to receive information about the program. The
loans are primarily taken up by those of lower economic status. For example those of
“general” (GM) or “other backward” castes are less likely to take loans, in other words
loans are more likely taken up by individuals in scheduled castes (the omitted group),
those recognized by India’s constitution as historically disadvantaged. Additionally,
loans are more likely to be taken up by those without access to in home sanitation.
Lastly, I include village fixed effects to account for contextual factors, i.e. factors
which impact all individuals in a given village. The existence of contextual factors is
one of the classic threats to identification of peer effects models outlined by Manski
(1993) and Moffitt et al. (2001). Since I have observations on multiple villages, I am
able to account for these contextual factors. Running the same models on the subset of
data where caste is observed yields broadly similar results, although the peer effect is no
longer significant when village fixed effects are added (possibly due to the decreased
sample size)
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2.4.3 Network Specification
There are many possible ways to specify the network, and I consider many different
ways to do so. I primarily use a network that has friendship indicators as binary. It is
also possible to use the weighted network that treats Ai j as a count of the number of
questions that i indicated a friendship with j. The weighted network gives additional
weight to friendships that are presumably closer, but the results are similar enough that I
have not reported them.
Since the microfinance program is primarily directed at women, it is possible that
female friendships are more meaningful in this context. Table 2.3 reports the results for
the model using only links that are nominated by female household members. It does
appear that the peer effects are slightly stronger using this definition of the network.
2.4.4 Placebo Test
There remains a concern that, rather than estimating a endogenous peer effect in
microfinance take-up, the model is yielding false positives based on preexisting factors
that I am unable to fully account for in the model. Since the identification strategy relies
on the timing and random selection of individuals to be initially informed, it would be
concerning if an identical specification estimated positive peer effects for an outcome
that should be independent of the timing and initial injection points. One way to check
for this is to see if the model returns positive coefficient estimates for an outcome that
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should be unrelated to the implementation of the program. One such variable, suggested
by Banerjee et al. (2013), is whether or not a household has a slate roof. This variable is
likely concentrated among wealthy households, and may even exhibit some sort of peer
influence; however, an individual’s choice of roofing material is determined prior to the
programs inception and already known to all.24 Consequently, any peer effect due to
installation of a slate roof should already have occurred.
I run an identical specification; however, this time I use as the outcome whether or
not the household has a slate roof. The results are presented in Table 2.4. While there is
a peer effect estimated in models that do not account for contextual effects (columns 2
and 5), this effect is small and indistinguishable from zero in the fixed effect models.
Presumably, the positive and significant coefficient is obtained due to differences across
villages in the extent of tile roofing.
2.5 Graphical Reconstruction
The social networks are collected from individual surveys of a sample of house-
holds and are therefore incomplete. This can be resolved by limiting the sample as
in Section 2.4; however, this precludes the use of any network statistic that relies on
knowledge of the entire network. In this specific case, it may be desirable to account for
the likelihood that an individual is informed about the program so that we isolate the
24The data was collected prior to the programs entry to the villages.
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effect of peer decision making and not the fact that some individuals may simply have
been uninformed. Banerjee et al. (2013) show that one of the best measures to account
for the likelihood of being informed about the program is eigenvector centrality.
As the name would imply, eigenvector centrality is calculated from the eigenvectors
of the adjacency matrix.25 Intuitively, it can be thought of as a measure of how well
connected an individual is in the network. As such, someone with high eigenvector
centrality is likely to be informed about the program because they have many connections,
someone with low eigenvector centrality is unlikely to be informed. Unfortunately,
eigenvector centrality is a measure that depends on knowing the whole network (for
example, someone may be highly central, but unsampled, and would have their centrality
underestimated accordingly.) This sampling problem can be resolved using a model to
obtain consistent estimates of which missing links are likely to form.
I estimate the probability a link forming between two households using an exponen-
tial random graph models (ERGMs).26 ERGMs nest a logit model as a special case,
but generalize to allow the use of network statistics in the model. Unfortunately, when
the network is egocentrically sampled many network statistics that might be of interest
are biased; however, Krivitsky et al. (2011) indicate that the degree distribution (the
25For details about the measure, along with other measures of centrality, the reader is directed to
Jackson (2008)
26The critical attribute of the model is that it provides consistent estimate of the likelihood of link
formation, while such results were not established prior to Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012), they have
been subsequently established in Chandrasekhar and Jackson (n.d.). The results are similar when using
other methods suggested by Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2012), including an link-independent logit model.
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distribution of the number of links each individual has) and mixing distributions (the
number of links between individuals of different types) are unbiased and can be used
to estimate the model. These models are very similar to what would be expected from
a logit model explaining link formation. A mixing matrix condition might imply that
the probability of a link forming is higher if the two households match on the observed
characteristic, for example if they are from the same caste.
I fit an ERGM to each village that has complete information about caste and pre-
dict probabilities of link formation for all connections between unsampled individuals
(connections between sampled individuals are assumed to be correctly observed.) I
then estimate the model using the reconstructed network. It would be ideal if graphical
reconstruction were to work for the peer effect as well; however, no such results have
been established. This is because the network affects peer effect estimation in two ways.
It is used to calculate the actual peer effects and has an important role in generating the
instrument, which means that the first stage of the two stage least squares may have bias
as well. Because of this, I provide two sets of results, those with the whole network in
columns (1) and (3) and those that are again restricted to the surveyed individuals in
columns (2) and (4). The first pair should be considered speculative in regards to the
peer effect estimation, while the second set should yield correct peer effects estimates
due to its focus on only sampled individuals.
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The estimates including eigenvector centrality are provided in Table 2.5. The first
two columns are the results of the model when estimated without reconstruction, the
reconstructed network is used in columns (3) and (4). The estimates of peer effects
are consistent across the models; however, as is expected the coefficient estimates for
eigenvector centrality vary widely. They are presumably correctly estimated in model
(4), where the sample is limited to only surveyed individuals (thus giving a proper
estimate of peer effects) and the graphical reconstruction corrects for the bias when
using eigenvector centrality in a sampled network. Column (4) indicates that individuals
with higher centrality are more likely to participate in the program, which is partially
due to them being more likely to be informed. Crucially, peer effects are still strongly
present in this model.
ERGMs also provide a means of simulating many networks that fit the model of link
formation. In addition to using the graphical reconstruction technique, I also propose
simulating many random networks using an ERGM and estimating the 2SLS model for
each. This is done to provide some intuition about how the estimates may vary based
on potential configurations of the unobserved links. While the graphical reconstruction
process establishes that the coefficient estimates will be consistent, little is known about
how such estimators behave when the predictive strength of the reconstructive model
varies. Simulating many possible networks can provide additional intuition in the case
where the model of network formation is weak. In the ideal case, a strong model of
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network formation will yield clear indicators of which links should be present and the
estimates will be perfect. Since friendship formation processes are often driven by
unobservables, these models rarely yield such strong predictions. Simulating many
networks allows us to obtain bounds on the parameters that account for some of this
randomness.
The bounded coefficients for the entire village are found in Table 2.6 while the results
restricted to only sampled individuals are in Table 2.7. The results indicate that the effect
of eigenvector centrality in the model varies widely, but that peer effect estimates are far
more consistent in this model. Intriguingly, the peer effect estimate results for the whole
sample in Table 2.6 (which are speculative) seem to behave quite well in that the results
mirror quite closely the results on the surveyed individuals only that are known to be
consistent (Table 2.7).27
2.6 Conclusion
I use new network based peer effect estimation strategies to estimate significant
peer effects in microfinance take-up. An additional friend participating in micro-finance
increases the probability that an individual participates by 6%-10%. The magnitude of
this effect fits with previous results regarding microfinance repayment, and is robust to
sampling error introduced by the data collection process. Most importantly, the results
27Formally establishing these results is an interesting avenue for further research.
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indicate the importance of careful specification of peer effects models as omitting factors
that may affect friendship formation biases the results.
This research may also have important implications for microfinance institutions and
others wishing to design interventions that have maximum participation. The choice of
a single individual to take up microfinance has significant spill-overs into the behavior
of the individual’s friends. Knowledge of the extent of this effect could help forecast
participation rates with more precision. In addition, the results from the graphical
reconstruction suggest avenues for future methodological research, for example, directly
establishing the properties of graphical reconstruction for the estimation of peer effects.
76
Chapter 2. Microfinance Peer Effects
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
All Households Full Sample Caste Observed
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Participation
Participation 0.175 (0.380) 0.184 (0.388) 0.173 (0.378)
Peer Participation 1.769 (2.134) 2.678 (2.492) 2.550 (2.417)
Covariates
Leader 0.125 (0.331) 0.140 (0.347) 0.135 (0.342)
Number of Rooms 2.381 (1.320) 2.441 (1.346) 2.487 (1.259)
Number of Beds 0.855 (1.386) 0.892 (1.340) 0.767 (1.111)
No Electricity 0.0653 (0.247) 0.0589 (0.235) 0.0527 (0.223)
No Latrine 0.723 (0.447) 0.712 (0.453) 0.750 (0.433)
GM or OBC 0.650 (0.477) 0.646 (0.478) 0.679 (0.467)
Eigenvector Centrality 0.0526 (0.0457) 0.0777 (0.0487) 0.0750 (0.0481)
Exogenous Peer Effects
Leader 1.607 (1.755) 2.536 (1.923) 2.521 (1.856)
Number of Rooms 24.85 (20.65) 38.28 (20.70) 39.74 (20.53)
Number of Beds 9.502 (10.56) 14.57 (12.10) 13.00 (10.56)
No Electricity 0.493 (0.941) 0.772 (1.157) 0.673 (1.076)
No Latrine 6.681 (5.698) 10.25 (5.885) 10.78 (5.871)
GM or OBC 6.786 (6.541) 10.44 (7.174) 10.44 (7.174)
Eigenvector Centrality 0.789 (0.692) 1.171 (0.744) 1.152 (0.746)
Observations 10087 4892 2240
All households refers to all households in all of the villages. Surveyed households limits
the sample to those surveyed to obtain friendship networks. Caste observed contains only
households in villages where caste is completely observed. “GM or OBC” refers to castes
that are not eligble for affirmative action; the whole sample and surveyed household column
values of “GM or OBC” are the average excluding those with missing values.
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Table 2.2: Peer Effects in Microfinance Participation
Full Sample Caste Observed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Endo. Peer Effect
Peer Participation -0.058* 0.086*** 0.072** -0.084 0.078*** 0.031
(0.035) (0.017) (0.037) (0.070) (0.011) (0.036)
Covariates
Leader 0.038* 0.027* 0.032** 0.067* 0.039 0.050*
(0.021) (0.015) (0.015) (0.034) (0.026) (0.029)
Number of Rooms -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of Beds -0.003 -0.002 -0.014 -0.018**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009)
No Electricity 0.031 0.027 0.069** 0.056**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.027)
No Latrine 0.047*** 0.035** 0.026 0.024
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
GM or OBC -0.004 -0.023
(0.026) (0.028)
Exogenous Peer Effects
Leader 0.021* -0.006 -0.000 0.034* 0.005 0.016*
(0.011) (0.005) (0.008) (0.018) (0.007) (0.009)
Number of Rooms -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Number of Beds 0.001* 0.001 0.002** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No Electricity -0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
No Latrine -0.006* -0.003 -0.003 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006)
GM or OBC 0.002 -0.001
(0.002) (0.004)
Village Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Mean Participation 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.173 0.173 0.173
Adjusted R-squared . 0.060 0.087 . 0.080 0.109
N 4892 4892 4892 2240 2240 2240
The outcome is whether or not an individual participated in the microfinance program. The
network used to calculate the peer effect is binary, indicating if the an individual in the house-
holds indicated a friend in another household. The coefficient on peer participation indicates
the effect of having one additional friend adopt microfinance.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Peer Effects in Microfinance Participation, Female Network
Full Sample Caste Observed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Endo. Peer Effect
Peer Participation -0.065 0.107*** 0.115*** -0.051 0.071*** 0.044
(0.046) (0.021) (0.030) (0.048) (0.024) (0.032)
Covariates
Leader 0.031 0.025* 0.027* 0.047* 0.039* 0.047**
(0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of Rooms -0.004 -0.006 -0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of Beds -0.003 -0.002 -0.010 -0.014*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
No Electricity 0.036* 0.034* 0.063** 0.060**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027)
No Latrine 0.036*** 0.029** 0.021 0.023
(0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
GM or OBC -0.005 -0.013
(0.028) (0.029)
Exogenous Peer Effects
Leader 0.024* -0.007 -0.005 0.029** 0.010 0.019*
(0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
Number of Rooms -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003** -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Number of Beds 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
No Electricity 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
No Latrine -0.007* -0.008 -0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
GM or OBC -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Village Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Mean Participation 0.184 0.184 0.184 0.167 0.167 0.167
Adjusted R-squared . 0.067 0.052 . 0.097 0.110
N 4887 4887 4887 2391 2391 2391
The outcome is whether or not an individual participated in the microfinance program. The
network used to calculate the peer effect is binary, indicating if a female member of the house-
hold indicated a friend in another household. The coefficient on peer participation indicates
the effect of having one additional friend adopt microfinance.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Placebo Test: Peer Effects in Tile Roofs
Full Sample Caste Observed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Endo. Peer Effect
Tile Roof 0.007 0.049*** 0.015 -0.035 0.057*** -0.004
(0.011) (0.006) (0.017) (0.035) (0.007) (0.027)
Covariates
Leader -0.068*** -0.025 -0.020 -0.035 -0.012 -0.005
(0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.049) (0.023) (0.023)
Number of Rooms -0.011 -0.017*** -0.019 -0.024**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010)
Number of Beds -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.007 -0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.013) (0.012)
No Electricity -0.032 -0.035 -0.116** -0.123***
(0.035) (0.038) (0.048) (0.046)
No Latrine 0.160*** 0.154*** 0.186*** 0.174***
(0.020) (0.017) (0.031) (0.029)
GM or OBC 0.016 -0.042
(0.048) (0.041)
Exogenous Peer Effects
Leader -0.013** -0.001 0.001 0.006 0.010* 0.008
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of Rooms -0.002*** -0.002* -0.005*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Beds 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
No Electricity 0.003 0.008 0.020*** 0.022*
(0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.012)
No Latrine -0.011*** 0.002 -0.014*** 0.007
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010)
GM or OBC -0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.002)
Village Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Mean Participation 0.332 0.332 0.332 0.410 0.410 0.410
Adjusted R-squared 0.067 0.278 0.325 . 0.296 0.343
N 4892 4892 4892 2240 2240 2240
The outcome is whether or not an individual participated in the microfinance program.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Peer Effects in Microfinance Participation, Include Eigenvector Centrality
No Reconstruction Graph. Reconstruction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Endo. Peer Effect
Peer Participation 0.062** 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.065**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.033)
Covariates
Leader 0.070*** 0.043 0.061*** 0.040
(0.019) (0.028) (0.018) (0.030)
Number of Rooms -0.006 0.000 -0.006 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
Number of Beds -0.012 -0.016* -0.010 -0.019**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
No Electricity 0.008 0.066** 0.010 0.065**
(0.020) (0.028) (0.018) (0.028)
No Latrine 0.042*** 0.024 0.041*** 0.026
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
GM or OBC -0.052*** -0.011 -0.035 -0.016
(0.019) (0.028) (0.023) (0.028)
Eigenvector Centrality 1.083 -0.185 -0.025 0.415
(1.545) (1.589) (1.326) (1.535)
Surveyed -0.029* 0.005
(0.016) (0.016)
Exogenous Peer Effects
Leader 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.012
(0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Number of Rooms -0.004*** -0.003** -0.003*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of Beds 0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
No Electricity 0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
No Latrine 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
GM or OBC 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Eigenvector Centrality -0.093 -0.032 -0.066 -0.083
(0.088) (0.104) (0.068) (0.095)
Surveyed 0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Participation 0.159 0.173 0.153 0.168
Adjusted R-squared 0.098 0.085 0.064 0.090
N 4571 2240 4600 2146
The outcome is whether or not an individual participated in the microfinance program. These models
contain eigenvector centrality, a proxy for whether or not an individual is informed about the program,
which is biased in a sampled network. Sample sizes change because isolated invidiuals are excluded
from the previous models, but included in reconstruction. Columns (1) and (3) contain all observations
with caste observed, even those not sampled, while Columns (2) and (4) retain the estimation sample of
surveyed households only.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Graphical Reconstruction: Bounds on Coefficients, Full Sample
min p25 p50 p75 max
Participation
Peer Participation 0.0455 0.0806 0.0880 0.0949 0.122
Covariates
Leader 0.0510 0.0603 0.0628 0.0650 0.0734
Number of Rooms -0.00899 -0.00679 -0.00608 -0.00546 -0.00277
Number of Beds -0.0133 -0.0104 -0.00953 -0.00881 -0.00587
No Electricity -0.00744 0.00393 0.00702 0.0102 0.0203
No Latrine 0.0318 0.0411 0.0429 0.0450 0.0522
GM or OBC -0.0525 -0.0389 -0.0350 -0.0309 -0.0142
Surveyed -0.0119 -0.00200 0.000814 0.00341 0.0124
Eigenvector Centrality -0.869 -0.0420 0.166 0.366 1.086
Exogenous Peer Effects
Leader -0.00527 0.000628 0.00231 0.00390 0.0102
Number of Rooms -0.00426 -0.00288 -0.00255 -0.00225 -0.00113
Number of Beds -0.00112 0.000364 0.000818 0.00124 0.00300
No Electricity -0.0102 -0.00396 -0.00174 0.000447 0.0110
No Latrine -0.0101 -0.00481 -0.00354 -0.00218 0.00296
GM or OBC -0.00230 0.00218 0.00304 0.00400 0.00795
Surveyed 0.000179 0.00296 0.00381 0.00466 0.00843
Eigenvector Centrality -0.129 -0.0882 -0.0781 -0.0677 -0.0373
These are the bounds on the estimation results from 1000 networks simulated via graphical
reconstruction. This table should be compared to models (1) and (3) of Table 2.5.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the village level in
parentheses.
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Table 2.7: Graphical Reconstruction: Bounds on Coefficients
min p25 p50 p75 max
Participation
Peer Participation 0.0525 0.0719 0.0759 0.0802 0.102
Covariates
Leader 0.0341 0.0376 0.0383 0.0392 0.0430
Number of Rooms -0.00143 -0.000960 -0.000866 -0.000775 -0.000197
Number of Beds -0.0190 -0.0183 -0.0182 -0.0180 -0.0174
No Electricity 0.0624 0.0663 0.0672 0.0680 0.0718
No Latrine 0.0251 0.0256 0.0257 0.0258 0.0265
GM or OBC -0.0190 -0.0143 -0.0134 -0.0124 -0.00778
Eigenvector Centrality -0.381 0.0554 0.139 0.224 0.532
Exogenous Peer Effects
Leader 0.00754 0.00995 0.0105 0.0110 0.0136
Number of Rooms -0.00198 -0.00187 -0.00184 -0.00182 -0.00172
Number of Beds -0.000281 -0.0000174 0.0000413 0.0001000 0.000434
No Electricity 0.00134 0.00185 0.00196 0.00209 0.00247
No Latrine -0.00304 -0.000424 0.000135 0.000678 0.00334
GM or OBC 0.00163 0.00301 0.00330 0.00360 0.00571
Eigenvector Centrality -0.114 -0.0868 -0.0815 -0.0763 -0.0466
These are the bounds on the estimation results from 1000 networks simulated via graphical
reconstruction. This table should be compared to models (2) and (4) of Table 2.5.
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3.1 Introduction
It is the belief of many parents, administrators, and public officials that students who
spend more time in school are less likely to get into trouble with the law. This belief
is based on a theory known as incapacitation, whereby students who might otherwise
engage in criminal activity are deprived of opportunities to break the law. Understanding
the impact of time spent in school on criminal behavior has important policy implications,
especially as school districts experiment with alternative schedules (year-round school,
four-day weeks, etc.) in an attempt to cut costs and/or boost student performance. In
order to estimate the casual relationship between time spent in school and youth crime,
variation in the school schedule is necessary. Existing studies rely on sporadically
occurring disruptions to school schedules which reduce the number of days a student
is in school in a given week, e.g. teacher inservice days (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003),
randomly occurring events such as strikes (Luallen, 2006), or furloughs (Akee et al.,
2013). We offer an alternative identification strategy, one which exploits the adoption of
four-day school weeks across counties and years within the state of Colorado, one of the
states where the four-day week is most pervasive.
Using variation in the number of days a student is in school each week, we estimate
the effect of school attendance on juvenile crime outcomes and demonstrate that juvenile
arrests for larceny increase in counties that have adopted a four-day school week. The
85
Chapter 3. Four-Day School Week
policy does not seem to impact other kinds of crime, as estimated coefficients for drug
and violent crimes do not attain statistical significance. We also show, using data on
reported crimes by day of the week, that there is not evidence of a displacement of
crimes; that is, absolute crime appears to be increasing as a result of the policy, it is not
just shifted from a school day to a day off.
Our study contributes to the juvenile crime and incapacitation literature in several
ways. First, we study long term patterns in behavior associated with incapacitation
rather than the short term responses to unexpected changes examined in prior research.2
Presumably, parents, schools, and communities can more adequately prepare for these
more permanent changes in the time students are away from school. Second, because
four-day school weeks are implemented much more frequently in rural areas, we analyze
effects on juvenile behavior in a setting which remains understudied relative to policies
in urban areas. Finally, we show that four-day school week policies may have unintended
consequences that should be considered when these policies are proposed.
The paper proceeds as follows. We review four-day school week policies and the
effects of school attendance on crime in Section 3.2. We outline our empirical methodol-
ogy in Section 3.3 and present the baseline results in Subsection 3.3.2. Section 3.4 shows
evidence that the findings persist across a variety of robustness checks. Section 3.5
concludes.
2While inservice days (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003) are planned ahead of time by school officials, they
appear sporadically throughout the year and often vary widely from location to locations.
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3.2 Juvenile Crime and Four-Day School Week Policies
3.2.1 How Might the Four-Day School Week Impact Youth Crime?
There are at least two channels in which students’ school attendance may affect
youth criminal behavior. Incapacitation refers to the notion that juveniles who are
kept busy will remain out of trouble; or, put differently, students who have less idle
time are less likely to engage in illegal activities. School, after-school programs, and
other youth programs are forms of juvenile incapacitation. In fact, it is a common
perception that increasing funds to expand these types of youth programs or lengthening
the time students are in school will reduce youth crime. However, the exact effect
of increasing school or youth program participation remains unclear. Incapacitation
is expected to reduce juvenile crime by providing students with adult supervision so
they have less opportunity to commit a crime. An alternative story is that school or
other youth programs increase the concentration of youth, sometimes bringing together
diverse groups of students, which may actually promote coordination of crime or provide
a space for conflict to arise.
One method of answering these questions is through experimental interventions in
after-school programs; however, their insight is limited because the programs typically
cannot be made mandatory and those most at risk avoid them (see Cross et al. (2009)).
Empirically, incapacitation effects have been widely studied and show decreases in
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criminal activity and other risky behavior such as teen pregnancy; however, the primary
focus of this literature has been on variation on the number of years spent in school
based on compulsory schooling laws (Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Black et al., 2008;
Berthelon and Kruger, 2011; Anderson, 2012; Anderson et al., 2013). This means
that the effects are often temporally distinct from the actual program occupying the
individuals, so these studies are able to provide little insight into the effect of a program
to keep students out of trouble in the immediate future. Additionally, they are unable to
estimate concentration effects.
Research that addresses the distinction between incapacitation and concentration
effects typically relies on exogenous variation in the amount of time that a student spends
in school. Jacob and Lefgren (2003) rely on teacher in-service days to estimate a causal
relationship between school attendance and crime. They find that juvenile property
crime declines by 14% on days when school is in session but violent crime for this
same group increases by 28% percent on school days. A reduction in property crime
associated with increased school attendance is consistent with incapacitation. The spike
in violent crime on these days provides evidence for a concentration story.
Luallen (2006) exploits school attendance variation caused by teacher strikes which
resulted in canceled school days to estimate an incapacitation effect. He finds that
juvenile property crime and violent crime increase on days with strikes, but that the
results are solely driven by urban areas. Akee et al. (2013) estimate the school-crime
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relationship based on public school teacher furlough days in Hawaii and find that time
off from school is associated with significantly fewer juvenile crimes which supports a
concentration story.
Using four-day school weeks allows us to make several contributions to the incapaci-
tation literature. The first is that the intervention we use is concentrated in rural areas,
meaning that we can gain insight into areas where effects on juvenile criminal behavior
have been less studied. Additionally, we are able to look both at overall crime rates
in counties with four-day school weeks over time, but can also examine concentration
effects by looking at crime on specific days of the week.
3.2.2 Four Day School Weeks and Colorado
As of 2008, seventeen states have switched a portion of their school schedules from
a five day week to a four-day week.3 The primary motivation for states to implement this
policy is to reduce transportation costs, which are especially salient to rural schools. The
four-day school week became particularly popular during the energy crisis in the 1970s,
at which time many states began changing laws regarding days spent in school. During
this same time the Colorado legislature changed their law from a mandatory number
3Starting with South Dakota in the 1930s, the following states have schools on the four-day week:
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana,
New Mexico, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming. However, many of these
programs are not very extensive. See http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-calendar-four-day-
school-week-overview.aspx for background on specific state legislation regarding found day schools.
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of school days to a mandatory number of hours, enabling districts in the state to adopt
a four-day school week. Subsequent to the law’s passage, alternative schedules have
increased in popularity to the point where approximately 20% of students in Colorado
attend four-day schools. This study exclusively focuses on the four-day school week
policy in Colorado. In Colorado, the schools who have adopted a four-day school week
most often cite financial savings as their reason (Grau and Shaughnessy, 1987; Donis-
Keller and Silvernail, 2009; Anderson and Walker, 2012). Other reasons schools have
decided to switch include parent support, improved attendance, and increased academic
performance.
Given that cost considerations are central to the decision to switch, research into four-
day school weeks has primarily focused on financial savings. Grau and Shaughnessy
(1987), using data from ten school districts in New Mexico, document that districts
operating on a four-day week experience a 10%-25% savings on fuel, electricity and
transportation costs. Griffith (2011) examines six school districts that are either on
the four-day week or in transition to that schedule and finds that the policy yields a
maximum of about 5.5% savings.4 Despite their growing prevalence, little work has been
done to understand the impact of four-day school weeks on students. To our knowledge,
the only study at this point which evaluates the impact of four-day school weeks is
4Four day school weeks have been of interest in popular media as well and journalists have gone to
some effort to examine specific cases of the policy change. A TIME Magazine article (Kingsbury, 2008)
reports that some rural school districts experienced large savings on transportation, utility, and insurance
costs as a result of the policy and a Wall Street Journal article (Herring, 2010) sheds light on the savings
that the policy has brought to a rural district in Georgia.
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Anderson and Walker (2012). They find a modest, but statistically significant, positive
relationship between the policy and elementary school students’ math and reading test
scores. Their findings suggest that switching to a four-day week does not compromise
student achievement, and may even improve it.
It is important to note that even under a four-day school schedule the number of hours
a student spends at school per year remains constant and is typically set by state statute.
To compensate for one fewer day of instruction, those on the four-day week schedule
attend school for more hours per day and/or more days in the year. Of the schools that
have switched in Colorado, roughly 80% are on a Monday through Thursday schedule
with Fridays off with the remainder on a Tuesday-Friday schedule with Mondays off.
In the case of an incapacitation story, theory suggests that juvenile crime will likely
increase in the counties that have adopted a four-day school week schedule, specifically
on the days of the week that students are not attending school (Monday or Friday) due to
lack of adult supervision. Not only are students not at school, their parents are also likely
at work and less likely to be aware of the students’ whereabouts. On the other hand, a
concentration story would imply that crime would go down in these areas because there
are fewer opportunities to interact with other students. Additionally, any effects due to
concentration would be observed on days that students are in school. Previewing results
in Subsection 3.3.2, the increases in juvenile property crime (especially larceny) would
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imply that the incapacitation effect dominates.5 There is little evidence of any specific
day of the week effects.
3.3 Data and Results
3.3.1 Data
We combine several data sources for our analysis which includes 64 counties in
Colorado for the years 1993-2009. Data indicating which schools are on a four-day
school week and the timing of when they switch from a five day schedule to a four-day
schedule come from the Colorado Department of Education.6 Figure 3.1 shows the
changes across counties and years in the percent of students on a four-day school week
in the state. Nearly half of all counties have at least one school that is on a four-day
school week. Nineteen percent of students in Colorado attend a school on this schedule.
This data source also links schools with counties.
We use the CCD (Common Core of Data from the National Center for Education
Statistics), which contains the universe of Colorado schools, to obtain total student
population by county and several measures of student body composition. The CCD and
5Jacob and Lefgren (2003) see concentration effects primarily with increases in juvenile violent
crime when school is in session. We see no discernible effect on violent crime, another indication that
concentration effects due to four-day school weeks are minimal, possibly because hours spent with the
same group of peers remain constant in a year.
6We would like to thank Mark Anderson of Montana State University for helping us obtain this data.
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the list of four-day schools are combined to obtain the treatment variable: the percentage
of students between grades 6 and 12 on a four-day school week. Juveniles of these ages
(11-17) account for over 99% of juvenile crimes reported in Colorado. While the results
are robust to alternate specifications,7 we believe the appropriate treatment group for
examining the effect of four-day schools is to examine its direct effect on the population
responsible for perpetrating most juvenile crime.
We use two sources of crime data. The first is county level arrest data from the
Colorado Department of Public Safety which contains reported arrests by crime type
by county in a given year. This data is available for the duration of the sample period
and summary statistics are contained in Table 3.1. This data has the advantage of being
comprehensive, covering all arrests in Colorado; however, since it is aggregated yearly
the timing does not match up with the treatment variable which is reported by the
academic calendar. The second dataset is obtained from the National Incident Based
Reporting System (NIBRS) program. NIBRS provides detailed information on reported
crime at an incident (reported crime) level, including the date of the crime. This allows
us to match the reported crime with the treatment variable by academic year and avoid
the timing problem. We limit our analysis to the set of observations with offender
information so that we may identify the age of the perpetrator of the crime. This is a
superset of arrests, because it includes people who are cited for a crime without actually
7These specifications include: all students on a four-day school week regardless of age, percentage of
schools on a 4 day week, and various binary forms of these
93
Chapter 3. Four-Day School Week
being arrested, which is a common occurrence. The number of offenses is aggregated
up to the county level, to match the level of treatment and the other dataset.
In addition to providing detailed data on individual crimes, an advantage of the
NIBRS data is that it flags the exact date of the offense as well as detailed demographic
characteristics of the offenders; this allows us to precisely identify juveniles in the sample
and examine changes in crime by day of the week. Unfortunately, Colorado has only
been fully participating in the NIBRS program since 1997, so the data is not available
for the entire sample period. Additionally, while the data covers most of Colorado,
there are some agencies (approximately 10% of agencies covering approximately 10%
of the state’s population) who do not participate in the program, reducing the number
of counties in the NIBRS sample to 61.8 Table 3.2 contains summary statistics about
offenses from NIBRS. The outcomes (both arrests and offenses) are normalized by
population and defined as crime (offenses or arrests) per 1000 population in the county.
Note that property crimes are a general category consisting of larceny, breaking and
entering, grand theft auto, and arson. Violent crimes consist of homicide, sexual assault,
robbery, and assault. Drug crimes are a separate category.9
8While I am able to adjust sample by dropping agencies that do not fully participate in NIBRS, any
remaining underreporting should cause the coefficient to be biased downwards, as the number of reported
crimes would be lower than actual number of crimes in the county.
9Some incidents involve more than one offense (i.e. breaking and entering while in possession of
illegal drugs). We count such incidents in both categories. While this results in some double counting of
incidents, the alternatives are less palatable. Dropping all of these incidents results in the loss of much of
the data. Some systems use a hierarchy such that an incident is categorized as its most “severe” offense
type; however, these distinctions are often arbitrary and can result in severe under-counting of some kinds
of crimes, especially drug offenses.
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Additionally, through the remainder of the paper we limit our estimation sample
to only rural counties leaving us with 47 treated categories. Rural in this context is
defined as counties that are not part of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA).10 Four day
schools are primarily undertaken in rural areas and consequently other rural areas make
the best control group. In the counties identified as urban, four-day schools make up a
small fraction of the total student body (less that 5%) whereas they make up a quarter of
students in rural areas. Additionally, no urban county has been fully treated, i.e. have
all of their students on a four-day week, or even had more than 20% of their students
treated.11 Many of the schools on four-day school weeks in urban areas are actually
in outlying rural areas of urban counties. To count these as “treated” seems suspect as
these areas likely have a very different crime pattern. While we feel strongly that this is
the correct way to estimate the effect of a four-day school week, we acknowledge all
may not feel the same way. Consequently, Section C.1 contains versions of the models
we use estimated with the entire sample. While there are some minor differences, the
results are largely the same.
10The MSAs ommitted are Denver, Boulder, Greeley, Colorado Springs, Fort Collins, Pueblo, and
Grand Junction. Other possible definitions of rural, such as population counts or only omitting the Denver
MSA, have been considered and have little influence on the estimated results.
11This matters because we would like to identify the effect off of true changes in schedule (i.e. adoption)
and not just noise from smaller changes in student population (which would change our treatment in small
ways). The “big” changes due to adoption are concentrated among the rural counties. Note that we have
estimated the models using the percentage of schools treated (which avoids noise in the treatment at the
cost of ignore the size of the schools treated) and obtained similar results.
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3.3.2 Results
We estimate the following fixed-effects model
yct = β0+β1Tct +β2xct + γc+δy+ εct (3.1)
where variable Tct is the percent of students in a county in a given year that are on a
four-day school week schedule, xct are county year level covariates (unemployment,
percent of students in county eligible for free lunch, race, and student/teacher ratio),
γc is a county level fixed effect, δy is a year fixed effect, and εct is the error term. The
treatment variable Tct is constructed by dividing the total number of students in a county
who are on the four-day week in a given year by the total number of students in a
county-year. When using the Colorado DPS arrests data we drop the year that a school
first adopts this policy since the crime data is reported by calendar year (as opposed to
academic year) and the initial year would only be partially treated.
Table 3.3 reports the point estimates associated with Equation 3.1. The results in
columns 7 and 8 show a significant increase in juvenile larceny. Switching all students in
a county to a four-day school week leads to 0.75 increase in juvenile arrests for larceny
per 1000 population. This effect is large, approximately 66% of a standard deviation,
although effects of this magnitude are not unusual in the literature.12 It is not implausible
that students who have an additional unsupervised day off during the week are more
12For example, Jacob and Lefgren (2003) find effects on property crimes that roughly range between
50% and 75% of a standard deviation.
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likely to engage in shoplifting and other petty theft, while other property crimes such as
arson and breaking and entering are not affected. This possibly accounts for the fact that
property crimes show a positive coefficient that is not statistically significant.13. These
results are replicated with the NIBRS data in Table 3.4. The estimated coefficients are
largely the same, but do not attain statistical significance (at least partially attributable
to the shorter sample). Across both datasets, the estimated effects of the percent of
students on a four-day school week on other types of crime appear sensible in direction
and magnitude.. A reduction in drug and violent crime is consistent with Jacob and
Lefgren (2003) results, but again is imprecisely measured.
3.3.3 Non-linear Treatment
The models presented to this point assume that the effect of the treatment is linear in
the percent of students treated. To address the possibility that the treatment is non-linear,
Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 contain results from models where the treatment is transformed
into discrete bins, treatment between 0% and 10%, treatment between 10% and 30%,
treatment between 30% and 100%, and treatment being equal to 100%.14 These variables
are all compared to the omitted (untreated) group. In this case, both the arrests and
13Even though larcenies are the largest subset of property crimes, analysis (unreported) of the other
component parts of larceny indicate no effect, which is likely responsible for this null result.
14These divisions are chosen because they roughly divide the treated counties into quartiles. We have
also tested various parametric forms of introducing non-linearity such as imposing a quadratic treatment.
These models differ little from the results with a linear treatment.
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the NIBRS data indicate that the effects of the policies are still significant and that the
magnitude of the effect increases with treatment intensity.
3.3.4 Day of the Week Results
Aggregating the NIBRS data to day of the week, county, year level allows us to
see if the four-day school week policy has any effect on specific days. For example,
incapacitation would imply that students commit more crimes on days that they are not
in school and are therefore unsupervised. Alternatively, a concentration story would tell
us that we should expect higher levels of crime on the four days students are in school,
but lower crime on the day they have off.
We run the following specification:
ydct = β0+β1Tct +β2DayO fWeekd +β3Tct ∗DayO fWeekd +β4xct + γc+δy+ εct
(3.2)
where DayO fWeek is a set of dummy variables indicating day of the week (Sunday is
the omitted group) which is then interacted with the treatment variable. A significant
coefficient on the interaction term would indicate that the treatment variable differentially
affects crime on each day of the week. However, the interaction term coefficients reported
in Table 3.7 are small and statistically insignificant.15 This may fit with the scenario
15This is one instance where including the urban counties seems to make a difference. Table C.5 does
indicates that there are some cyclical patterns to crime over the week that do vary on treatment; however,
it is unclear if this is caused by treatment or by including observations with vastly different patterns in
crime.
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where there are small or nonexistent effects of incapacitation on any given day, but the
overall increase of free time leads students to get into trouble more frequently.
3.4 Additional Robustness Checks
The results above are robust to a variety of alternative specifications, including
changing the treatment definition to be percent of schools instead of students and varying
the definition of rural. Two additional robustness checks, a placebo test using adult
crime and a check for the exogeneity of policy decisions, are examined in this section.
3.4.1 Adult Crime Placebo Test
To ensure that the treatment variable is not picking up some underlying change, such
as changes in the local economy or law enforcement practices, we run identical models
using adult (age 25+) crime as the outcome.16 If juvenile crime is actually increasing in
areas because of the treatment (the four-day week policy) then we should not expect to
see a statistically significant relationship between the percent of juveniles on a four-day
week in a given county-year and adult crimes per 1,000. Table 3.8 contains the results
for adult arrests data and Table 3.9 contains the results for NIBRS data. Neither dataset
indicates a significant effect for adult crime, supporting the idea that a four-day school
16Individuals ages 18-25 are left out of these models. Some 18 year olds are still in high school (and
are therefore in the treated population) and those just out of high school are likely to socialize with treated
individuals and may be indirectly affected by treatment.
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week policy is uniquely impacting juveniles and is not a proxy for other unobserved
changes in the county.
3.4.2 Leads of the Treatment Variables
A concern with our empirical approach which would threaten the identification of
our estimates is if school districts are adopting this policy in response to the current
crime rate in the county. For instance, if schools in counties with high crime rates adopt
the four-day week policy as a means to reduce crime (and potentially are adopting other
crime reducing policies concurrently), then the internal validity of our results will be
jeopardized.17 We check for this type of adoption behavior by including leads of the
treatment variable to Equation 3.1. We follow a similar approach to that of Gruber and
Hanratty (1995), Friedberg (1998), and Bedard and Do (2005) and run the following
model:
yct = β0+β1Tct +β2xct +λ14Tct+1+λ24Tct+2+ γc+δy+ εct (3.3)
Note that the two lead terms 4Tct+1 and 4Tct+2 are the percent of students in a
four-day school in a county between year t=0 and t=1 and then between t=1 and t=2,
respectively. Thus, the estimated coefficients on these two lead terms represent the
relationship between the change in four-day school week adoption between years t/t+1
17Note that this assumes that the error term εct is uncorrelated over time. If there are unobserved factors
that affect crime at time t and are correlated with subsequent adoption, this approach may not be valid.
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and t+1/t+2 and crime in that county. If high crime rates in a county lead to the adoption
of a four-day school week, we should observe school districts responding to high crime
rates by adopting the four-day week in the following year and thus the estimates on the
lead terms λ1and λ2 should be positive and significant. Table 3.10 contains the results
for the NIBRS data and the estimates on the lead terms are statistically insignificant
and, even though they are occasionally large, vary widely in sign indicating that schools
likely are not adopting this policy as a response to crime rates.18
3.5 Conclusion
We demonstrate that the implementation four-day school weeks is associated with
increases in property crime, especially larceny, while effects on other types of crime
are less clear. These increase in larceny committed by juveniles seems to be due to an
overall increase in crime. We find little evidence that the four-day school week policy
affected the distribution of crimes across days of the week. These results are consistent
with an incapacitation story, where juveniles who have more unsupervised time are more
likely to commit crimes, and are present in two different datasets. Additionally, the
effects persist across a variety of robustness checks. Overall, these results suggest that
18This test is not feasible in the arrests data because we drop the year of adoption due to it being
partially treated.
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policymakers considering school schedule changes should also be aware of the possible
impacts on criminal behavior.
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Figure 3.1: Adoption of Four-Day School Week Policy Across Colorado Counties Over
Time
Year: 1993
Only Four Day Schools
30%-100%
10%-30%
0%-10%
No Four Day Schools
Year: 2009
Only Four Day Schools
30%-100%
10%-30%
0%-10%
No Four Day Schools
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
All Counties Urban Counties Rural Counties Untreated Treated
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Percent in 4-Day Schoolweek 0.187 0.0447 0.235 0.283
(0.329) (0.0894) (0.365) (0.370)
0 < Treatment < 0.1 0.148 0.140 0.151 0.225
(0.356) (0.348) (0.358) (0.418)
0.1 <= Treatment < 0.3 0.149 0.198 0.133 0.226
(0.357) (0.399) (0.340) (0.419)
0.3 <= Treatment < 1 0.0612 0 0.0818 0.0928
(0.240) (0) (0.274) (0.290)
Treatment=1 0.112 0 0.150 0.170
(0.316) (0) (0.357) (0.376)
Friday Off 0.551 0.572 0.544 0.835
(0.498) (0.496) (0.498) (0.372)
Monday Off 0.192 0.132 0.212 0.291
(0.394) (0.339) (0.409) (0.455)
Juv. Prop. Crime 1.507 2.503 1.171 1.471 1.518
(1.653) (2.021) (1.354) (1.515) (1.719)
Juv. Vio. Crime 0.172 0.272 0.138 0.187 0.164
(0.278) (0.309) (0.258) (0.356) (0.225)
Juv. Drug Crime 0.419 0.774 0.299 0.476 0.389
(0.478) (0.488) (0.412) (0.537) (0.441)
Juv. Larceny 1.147 1.967 0.870 1.145 1.141
(1.383) (1.708) (1.129) (1.258) (1.443)
Adult Prop. Crime 2.869 3.942 2.507 3.190 2.726
(2.332) (2.710) (2.070) (2.474) (2.283)
Adult Vio. Crime 1.149 1.292 1.100 1.290 1.082
(1.023) (1.257) (0.926) (1.247) (0.884)
Adult Drug Crime 2.108 2.982 1.814 2.563 1.908
(2.036) (2.349) (1.829) (2.269) (1.923)
Adult Larceny 2.207 3.253 1.854 2.488 2.086
(2.016) (2.438) (1.716) (2.152) (1.982)
Rural County 0.748 0 1 0.675 0.781
(0.434) (0) (0) (0.469) (0.414)
Population 70351.1 239280.5 13416.5 80123.0 64836.5
(139968.3) (197936.4) (12543.6) (136226.8) (141365.0)
Unemployment Rate 4.794 4.662 4.839 4.638 4.864
(2.093) (1.566) (2.242) (2.112) (2.079)
Percent on Free Lunch 0.257 0.204 0.276 0.200 0.286
(0.147) (0.134) (0.147) (0.140) (0.143)
Percent White 0.750 0.738 0.755 0.784 0.734
(0.187) (0.195) (0.185) (0.184) (0.187)
Student/Teacher Ratio 0.0716 0.0574 0.0764 0.0694 0.0727
(0.0173) (0.00481) (0.0173) (0.0189) (0.0165)
Observations 964 243 721 332 636
Rural counties are defined as those outside of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Two counties contain both types,
Monday off and Friday off, of four-day schools
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Table 3.2: NIBRS Summary Statistics
All Counties Urban Counties Rural Counties Untreated Treated
mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd mean/sd
Percent in 4-Day School Week 0.167 0.0407 0.211 0.244
(0.312) (0.0832) (0.348) (0.351)
0 < Treatment < 0.1 0.190 0.199 0.186 0.277
(0.392) (0.400) (0.390) (0.448)
0.1 <= Treatment < 0.3 0.136 0.182 0.120 0.198
(0.343) (0.387) (0.325) (0.399)
0.3 <= Treatment < 1 0.0552 0 0.0741 0.0806
(0.228) (0) (0.262) (0.272)
Treatment=1 0.100 0 0.135 0.147
(0.301) (0) (0.342) (0.354)
Friday Off 0.557 0.646 0.527 0.814
(0.497) (0.479) (0.500) (0.389)
Monday Off 0.208 0.138 0.232 0.304
(0.406) (0.346) (0.422) (0.460)
Juv. Prop. Crime 2.476 3.467 2.135 2.720 2.405
(3.422) (3.743) (3.239) (4.584) (2.904)
Juv. Vio. Crime 0.842 1.239 0.705 0.902 0.827
(1.203) (1.313) (1.132) (1.565) (1.048)
Juv. Drug Crime 0.744 1.201 0.587 0.809 0.719
(1.206) (1.475) (1.055) (1.316) (1.154)
Juv. Larceny 1.204 1.747 1.017 1.365 1.163
(2.005) (1.958) (1.989) (2.916) (1.566)
Adult. Prop. Crime 18.11 24.12 16.04 29.45 17.41
(19.64) (19.75) (19.18) (115.7) (19.45)
Adult. Vio. Crime 3.514 4.067 3.324 4.864 3.189
(3.186) (3.650) (2.991) (8.583) (2.653)
Adult. Drug Crime 1.481 1.881 1.343 2.814 1.368
(1.500) (1.486) (1.482) (11.79) (1.365)
Adult. Larceny 9.141 11.22 8.424 19.56 8.232
(11.49) (9.418) (12.04) (98.00) (9.916)
Rural County 0.744 0 1 0.700 0.758
(0.437) (0) (0) (0.459) (0.429)
Population 74115.1 246118.0 14927.7 64273.3 78156.5
(144690.5) (203948.8) (13500.3) (117054.5) (155460.8)
Unemployment Rate 4.672 4.579 4.704 4.515 4.731
(1.849) (1.579) (1.933) (1.887) (1.828)
Percent on Free Lunch 0.260 0.187 0.285 0.188 0.292
(0.147) (0.120) (0.147) (0.136) (0.141)
Percent White 0.742 0.758 0.736 0.801 0.716
(0.177) (0.169) (0.179) (0.162) (0.177)
Student/Teacher Ratio 0.0715 0.0578 0.0762 0.0708 0.0716
(0.0165) (0.00457) (0.0164) (0.0205) (0.0145)
Observations 707 181 526 227 484
Rural counties are defined as those outside of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Two counties contain both types,
Monday off and Friday off, of four-day schools
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Table 3.5: Nonlinear Treatment: Arrest Data from Colorado DPS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Juv. Prop. Crime Juv. Vio. Crime Juv. Drug Crime Juv. Larceny
0 < Treatment < 0.1 -0.022 0.066 -0.037 0.148
(0.357) (0.048) (0.076) (0.225)
0.1 <= Treatment < 0.3 -0.474 0.026 0.057 -0.225
(0.399) (0.040) (0.069) (0.277)
0.3 <= Treatment < 1 -0.311 -0.013 -0.090 0.067
(0.447) (0.080) (0.112) (0.250)
Treatment=1 0.198 0.009 -0.153 0.568**
(0.489) (0.082) (0.156) (0.259)
Time Vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 766 766 722 766
Mean Dep. Var. 1.205 0.140 0.299 0.888
S.D. Dep. Var. 1.399 0.258 0.411 1.142
The estimation sample is resticted to only rural counties (those outside an MSA). The outcome is
measured as arrests per 1000 population and is observed annually. Since the treatment is administered
on academic year, the initial year of treatment is dropped from the analysis.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Nonlinear Treatment: NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Juv. Prop. Crime Juv. Vio. Crime Juv. Drug Crime Juv. Larceny
0 < Treatment < 0.1 0.516 0.325 -0.076 0.486
(0.810) (0.217) (0.228) (0.397)
0.1 <= Treatment < 0.3 0.983* 0.457** 0.083 0.567*
(0.505) (0.170) (0.183) (0.307)
0.3 <= Treatment < 1 1.340 0.165 -0.194 1.093**
(1.032) (0.421) (0.218) (0.511)
Treatment=1 0.920 0.102 -0.428 0.840
(0.898) (0.286) (0.496) (0.508)
Time Vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 526 526 526 526
Mean Dep. Var. 2.135 0.705 0.587 1.017
S.D. Dep. Var. 3.239 1.132 1.055 1.989
The estimation sample is resticted to only rural counties (those outside an MSA). The outcome is
measured as offenses per 1000 population and is observed by academic year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.
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Table 3.7: Day of Week Analysis: NIBRS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Juv. Vio. Crime Juv. Drug Crime Juv. Prop. Crime Juv. Larceny
Percent in 4-Day 0.067 0.004 0.351* 0.276**
School Week (0.055) (0.089) (0.175) (0.119)
Monday 0.035* 0.032* 0.057 0.059
(0.018) (0.018) (0.057) (0.038)
Tuesday 0.077** 0.059** 0.005 0.061
(0.031) (0.025) (0.057) (0.045)
Wednesday 0.045* 0.077*** 0.011 0.044
(0.026) (0.024) (0.046) (0.027)
Thursday 0.049** 0.062** -0.032 0.034
(0.023) (0.023) (0.052) (0.029)
Friday 0.080** 0.111*** 0.199** 0.101***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.082) (0.033)
Saturday 0.011 0.046** 0.060 0.061**
(0.012) (0.022) (0.049) (0.027)
(% in 4-Day)*Mon -0.020 -0.061 -0.086 -0.049
(0.030) (0.051) (0.075) (0.052)
(% in 4-Day)*Tue -0.050 -0.090 -0.005 -0.057
(0.043) (0.065) (0.083) (0.065)
(% in 4-Day)*Wed -0.027 -0.047 -0.078 -0.040
(0.056) (0.035) (0.074) (0.041)
(% in 4-Day)*Thu -0.030 -0.066 0.043 -0.038
(0.037) (0.063) (0.074) (0.039)
(% in 4-Day)*Fri -0.084 -0.181** -0.171 -0.042
(0.054) (0.072) (0.133) (0.068)
(% in 4-Day)*Sat -0.009 -0.086 -0.064 -0.042
(0.021) (0.053) (0.069) (0.039)
Time Vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2971 2971 2971 2971
Mean Dep. Var. 0.123 0.099 0.355 0.163
S.D. Dep. Var. 0.270 0.310 0.801 0.455
The estimation sample is resticted to only rural counties (those outside an MSA). The outcome is
measured as offenses per 1000 population and is observed by academic year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.
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A.1 Proofs
Proof. Identification in each individual network implies identification in the model with
multiple networks. Assume peer effects are identified in the model for each individual
network as in Equation 1.14. This implies that the matrices In, G`, and G2` are linearly
independent. By the definition of linear independence, this means that the equation
c`1In+ c
`
2G`+ c
`
3G
2
` = 0
has only the trivial solution c`1 = c
`
2 = c
`
3 = 0 for all ` in 1 to L. Now consider the block
diagonal matrices InB, G∗ and (G∗)2 and note that `th element of the diagonal is the
matrix outlined above In, G`, and G2` . Since these matrices are linearly independent, the
off-diagonal elements are all 0, and this is true for all `, it follows that the block diagonal
matrices are also linearly independent, and therefore peer effects are identified.
Proof. Identification in the model with multiple networks does not imply identification
in in any specific network. To satisfy this proof, it suffices to find a situation where
peer effects are not identified in the subnetworks but are identified in the general model.
I provide a simple case, where there are two subnetworks in the model, each where
peer effects are not identified. If peer effects are identified in the general model, it
means that the matrices InB, G∗ and (G∗)2 are linearly independent and the equation
d1InB+d2G∗+d3(G∗)2 = 0 has only the trivial solution. Suppose that the model for the
subnetworks G1 and G2 is not identified, which means that the there exists at least one
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nontrivial solution to the functions
c11In+ c
1
2G1+ c
1
3G
2
1 = 0
and
c21In+ c
2
2G1+ c
2
3G
2
2 = 0.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that c11 = c
2
1, c
1
2 = c
2
2, and c
1
3 = c
2
3 for at least one of
the solutions to the models for G1 and G2. Because the block diagonal matrix consists
of only these two outcomes and 0’s on the off diagonal elements, if follows that these
values yield a nontrivial solution to
c11InB+ c
1
2G
∗+ c13(G
∗)2 = 0
which means that the matrices are linearly dependent and peer effects are not identified
in the general model, a contradiction.
Discussion: Note that if at least one of c11 6= c21, c12 6= c22, and c13 6= c23 these values
cannot provide a solution that makes the block diagonal system linearly dependent.
Hence, peer effects can still be identified in the general model, even if they are not in the
individual models. Note that a similar result will hold for a block diagonal matrix of any
size which means that even if peer effects are identified in the general model, there may
be any number of submodels where identification fails.
122
Appendix A. Appendices to Chapter 1
A.2 Cosponsorship Data
The cosponsorship network data was gathered and used by James Fowler (Fowler,
2006a,b) and is available for download at a website, http://jhfowler.ucsd.
edu/cosponsorship.htm, maintained by the author with data for subsequent
congressional sessions incorporated by Andrew Scott Waugh and Yunkyu Sohn. Cospon-
sorship relationships are derived not just from bills, but also resolutions, amendments,
and procedural votes when applicable (all these are referred to as “bills” throughout
the paper). Bills without cosponsors are dropped. Legislators who never sponsor or
cosponsor a bill are also dropped from the analysis, to allow for row-weighting of the
adjacency matrix. These individuals almost all serve for very short periods of time. The
fact that more bills are introduced than ever reach a vote, combined with the inclusion
of amendments and resolutions, means that the cosponsorship network is defined over a
large number of bills for each session (sometimes over 10,000).
The roll call data is made available by Poole and Rosenthal (2000) at the website
voteview.org. Roll call votes include a vote on any measure where a roll call
vote is requested by members of the chamber and can include procedural measures (i.e.
adjournment of the session) in addition to final votes on legislation. The data is processed
to remove unanimous and near unanimous votes (votes with less than 3% dissenting)
because they provide no information about the voting outcomes. Representatives who
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do not vote in more than 50% of the roll-calls are dropped from the analysis due to
small sample sizes. This is all done using the pscl package (Jackman, 2012), designed
specifically for this purpose. Modifying the 3% and 50% thresholds has no impact on
the results of the paper.
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B.1 Questions Used to Elicit Networks
Individuals were asked about who they:
• borrow money from
• give advice to
• help with a decision
• borrow kerosene (or rice) from
• lend kerosene (or rice) to
• lend money to
• obtain medical advice from
• engage socially with
• are related to
• go to temple with
• invite to one’s home
• visit in another’s home
to form the friendship network. The primary network used in this paper is the union of
responses to these questions. This limits the amount of measurement error in responses
due to
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C.1 Estimates with All Counties
This appendix contains tables with results from estimating the four-day school week
models with the entire sample. The tables above are limited to only rural counties, as
defined by the Census Bureau. As discussed in text, the results are largely similar, with
a few exceptions. The first is that effects are more significant, likely due to the increased
sample size. The second is that there are some patterns observed in the results for the
estimation by days of the week and the adult placebo test that are somewhat different
from the rural sample. The day of the week analysis shows that there may be some
differences in the weekly cycle of crime due to treatment; the adult placebo test has
a coefficient that nears (but does not attain) statistical significance at the 10% level
on adult larceny. It is difficult to tell if these differences are actually due to effects of
treatment or if they are due to substantially different patterns in crime across urban and
rural counties.
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Table C.3: Nonlinear Treatment: Arrest Data from Colorado DPS (Whole Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Juv. Prop. Crime Juv. Vio. Crime Juv. Drug Crime Juv. Larceny
0 < Treatment < 0.1 0.069 0.054 0.147* 0.205
(0.266) (0.044) (0.077) (0.190)
0.1 <= Treatment < 0.3 -0.376 0.036 0.126* -0.155
(0.368) (0.041) (0.068) (0.252)
0.3 <= Treatment < 1 -0.068 0.003 -0.011 0.228
(0.425) (0.080) (0.118) (0.240)
Treatment=1 0.563 0.051 -0.075 0.817***
(0.481) (0.089) (0.166) (0.250)
Time Vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1029 1029 970 1029
Mean Dep. Var. 1.555 0.176 0.419 1.177
S.D. Dep. Var. 1.711 0.285 0.478 1.416
The outcome is measured as arrests per 1000 population and is observed annually. Since the treatment
is administered on academic year, the initial year of treatment is dropped from the analysis.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.
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Table C.4: Nonlinear Treatment: NIBRS (Whole Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Juv. Prop. Crime Juv. Vio. Crime Juv. Drug Crime Juv. Larceny
0 < Treatment < 0.1 0.093 0.238 0.121 0.325
(0.545) (0.190) (0.160) (0.297)
0.1 <= Treatment < 0.3 0.831* 0.475*** 0.157 0.516*
(0.459) (0.175) (0.176) (0.276)
0.3 <= Treatment < 1 1.119 0.284 -0.131 1.021**
(1.005) (0.434) (0.224) (0.466)
Treatment=1 0.694 0.228 -0.414 0.710
(0.807) (0.298) (0.508) (0.457)
Time Vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 711 711 711 711
Mean Dep. Var. 2.506 0.851 0.748 1.228
S.D. Dep. Var. 3.528 1.236 1.208 2.094
The outcome is measured as offenses per 1000 population and is observed by academic year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.
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Table C.5: Day of Week Analysis: NIBRS (Whole Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Juv. Vio. Crime Juv. Drug Crime Juv. Prop. Crime Juv. Larceny
Percent in 4-Day 0.073 0.005 0.304** 0.230***
School Week (0.045) (0.086) (0.130) (0.084)
Monday 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.079** 0.063***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.036) (0.023)
Tuesday 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.055 0.074***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.036) (0.027)
Wednesday 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.061* 0.071***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.035) (0.024)
Thursday 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.016 0.044**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.032) (0.017)
Friday 0.089*** 0.108*** 0.172*** 0.089***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.048) (0.020)
Saturday 0.009 0.055*** 0.084*** 0.068***
(0.007) (0.016) (0.030) (0.017)
(% in 4-Day)*Mon -0.036 -0.064 -0.121** -0.057
(0.026) (0.045) (0.051) (0.035)
(% in 4-Day)*Tue -0.054* -0.108* -0.074 -0.074*
(0.029) (0.061) (0.060) (0.042)
(% in 4-Day)*Wed -0.038 -0.036 -0.146** -0.079*
(0.047) (0.034) (0.065) (0.041)
(% in 4-Day)*Thu -0.055* -0.074 -0.022 -0.053**
(0.033) (0.060) (0.051) (0.025)
(% in 4-Day)*Fri -0.098** -0.178*** -0.139 -0.027
(0.042) (0.060) (0.101) (0.057)
(% in 4-Day)*Sat -0.007 -0.094* -0.094** -0.052*
(0.017) (0.048) (0.046) (0.027)
Time Vars. Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4625 4625 4625 4625
Mean Dep. Var. 0.133 0.117 0.393 0.191
S.D. Dep. Var. 0.272 0.305 0.739 0.430
The outcome is measured as offenses per 1000 population and is observed by academic year.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.
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Table C.6: Effect on Adult Crime: Arrest Data from Colorado DPS (Whole Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Adult Prop. Crime Adult Vio. Crime Adult Drug Crime Adult Larceny
Percent in 4-Day 0.722* 0.501 0.721 0.581**
Schoolweek (0.404) (0.354) (1.060) (0.278)
Unemployment Rate -0.043 -0.065* -0.066 -0.021
(0.056) (0.035) (0.063) (0.046)
Percent on Free -2.163 -0.034 -2.677 -1.698
Lunch (2.814) (1.129) (1.611) (1.727)
Percent White 1.850 -1.288 -4.005 2.286
(3.604) (1.989) (3.189) (3.015)
Student/Teacher 7.571 -8.413 -7.959 9.778
Ratio (14.022) (5.863) (10.835) (11.822)
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1025 1025 964 1024
Mean Dep. Var. 2.911 1.152 2.108 2.228
S.D. Dep. Var. 2.352 1.039 2.036 2.031
The outcome is measured as arrests per 1000 population and is observed annually. Since the treatment is
administered on academic year, the initial year of treatment is dropped from the analysis. Adults are
defined as those age 25+.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses.
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